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INTRODUCTION

Several recent high-profile cases have illustrated flaws with
the government's discovery practices in criminal cases and have put
prosecutors across the country on the defensive about their compliance
with disclosure obligations. The conviction of former Alaska Senator
Ted Stevens on ethics charges was set aside after it was revealed that
federal prosecutors withheld notes of an interview with a key
government witness; one member of the Stevens prosecution team
who was under investigation for contempt subsequently committed
suicide.1 The Supreme Court remanded a double murder case from
Tennessee for potential resentencing after it was revealed that state
prosecutors had withheld substantial evidence of inconsistent
statements made by government witnesses. 2 Chemical giant W.R.
Grace and three of its high-level executives were acquitted on criminal
environmental charges in Montana after a federal judge gave
blistering jury instructions criticizing the prosecution team for failing
3
to disclose the depth of their relationship with a star whistleblower.
In each of these cases, prosecutors drew the ire of the judiciary for
their cavalier approach to discovery and their lack of attention to the
constitutional rights of defendants. These stories and others 4 have
made the public more attuned than ever before to the prevalence and
pernicious consequences of prosecutorial misconduct.

1.
United States v. Stevens, No. 08-cr-231 (EGS), 2009 WL 6525926 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2009)
(order setting aside verdict); Jeffrey Toobin, Casualties of Justice, NEW YORKER, Jan. 3, 2011, at
39.
2.
Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1786 (2009).
3.
United States v. W.R. Grace Co., CR 05-07-M-DWM (D. Mont. 2009). The jury
instructions are summarized at http://www.insidecounsel.com/Issues/2009/July-2009/Pages/
Fiery-Jury-Instructions.aspx.
4.
In response to another disclosure violation in a high-profile federal organized crime
prosecution, then-Chief District Judge for the District of Massachusetts, Mark Wolf, initiated
disciplinary proceedings against a prosecutor in his own court, having documented several prior
instances of Brady violations in the District from which he concluded that the Department of
Justice was either unable or unwilling to police prosecutors who violated their discovery
obligations. See In re Auerhahn, 650 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D. Mass. 2009); Shelley Murphy, Three
Judge Panel Urged to Suspend Lawyer, BoS. GLOBE, Dec. 12, 2010, at 1. Subsequently, a panel of
three District Court judges declined to impose discipline. See In re Auerhahn, 2011 WL 4352350,
at *13 (D. Mass. Sept. 15, 2011) (concluding that bar counsel failed to make out a violation of
attorney conduct rules by the AUSA by clear and convincing evidence in organized crime
prosecution; although prosecutor "fail[ed] to document more carefully" inconsistent statements
that cooperating witness had made to him and investigators during debriefing and trial
preparations sessions, and took "too casual an approach" to his discovery obligations, bar counsel
had failed to prove "actual knowledge" by prosecutor of exculpatory evidence).
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What do those three cases have in common? All involved socalled "impeachment evidence," which the prosecutor is required to
disclose to the defendant under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments if the evidence has any reasonable
probability of affecting the outcome of a criminal case. 5 Impeachment
is the process of challenging a witness with the objective of weakening
or discrediting his testimony. "Impeachment evidence" is any evidence
that can be used by the defendant-typically on cross-examination-to
undermine the credibility of a government witness. It includes
promises, rewards, and inducements made by the prosecution to its
witnesses that might establish the witness's bias in favor of the
government; prior statements inconsistent with the witness's trial
testimony that could be used on cross-examination to show fabrication
or mistake; acts or conduct showing the witness's motive of ill will or
hostility toward the defendant; past misconduct of the witness
showing character for dishonesty; and medical, mental health, or
addiction issues that might cloud the witness's ability to perceive,
remember, or narrate.
Deciding whether and when to disclose impeachment evidence
is one of the thorniest problems prosecutors face.6 The impeachment
concept has almost limitless elasticity, and it can be difficult for
prosecutors to assess the "materiality" of impeachment evidence
before a trial has commenced and the parties' strategies (and witness
lists) have crystallized. There is also an ever-present danger that some
impeachment material might be possessed by government agents
investigating the case but unknown to the prosecutor.7 Finally,
impeachment disclosures risk exposing witnesses to harassment,
intimidation, and embarrassment before trial. Due to these problems
and uncertainties, many prosecutors now draft plea agreements to
require the defendant to waive disclosure of impeachment evidence
upon a guilty plea to avoid efforts to reopen a conviction should such
8
information come to light after sentencing.
5.
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
6.
See Bruce A. Green, Beyond Training Prosecutors About Their Disclosure Obligations:
Can Prosecutors' Offices Learn from Their Lawyers' Mistakes?, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2161, 2179
(2010).
7.
See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (construing Brady v. Maryland to require
prosecutors to "learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's
behalf in the case, including the police").
8.
A typical federal plea agreement includes a waiver provision such as the following:
The defendant understands that discovery may not have been completed in this case,
and that there may be additional discovery to which he would have access if he elected
to proceed to trial. The defendant agrees to waive his right to receive this additional
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There are now serious battles looming over the disclosure of
impeachment information that have the potential to pit prosecutors
against bar disciplinary authorities. This issue is reminiscent of the
controversies in the mid-1990s over then Model Rule 3.8(f) (the
attorney subpoena rule) and Model Rule 4.2 (the no-contact rule), each
of which raised fundamental constitutional questions regarding who
has the power to regulate the conduct of federal prosecutors practicing
in U.S. courts.9 Government attorneys argue that there is no
constitutional duty to disclose impeachment evidence before trial
unless it is "material" (that is, possibly outcome determinative)10 and
no constitutional obligation whatsoever to disclose impeachment
information prior to a guilty plea.1 1 But in 2009, the Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility of the American
Bar Association ("ABA") issued a formal ethics opinion construing
Model Rule 3.8 to impose discovery obligations on prosecutors far
broader than those imposed by the Due Process Clause and most
states' rules of criminal procedure.12 If state bar disciplinary
authorities follow the lead of the ABA and interpret their own rules of
prosecutorial ethics in a similarly broad fashion, then they may force
another showdown on the issue of who has the authority to regulate
the discovery practices of this nation's prosecutors with regard to
impeachment material.
This Article proceeds in five parts. In Part I, I review the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence to date under the Due Process Clause
with regard to the disclosure of exculpatory evidence. In Part II, I
examine the nature and scope of impeachment evidence and the
various factual contexts in which it might arise in criminal cases. I
argue that impeachment material presents far greater complexities
than "classically" exculpatory evidence for the reasons the Supreme
Court recognized but failed adequately to explain in United States v.
Ruiz. 13 In Part III, I discuss developments since the Ruiz decision-in
discovery which may include, among other things, evidence tending to impeach the
credibility of potential witnesses.
Erica G. Franklin, Waiving ProsecutorialDisclosure in the Guilty Plea Process:A Debate on the
Merits of "Discovery"Waivers, 51 STAN. L. REV. 567, 568 (1999).
9.
See Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell, State Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecutors: The
Controversies over the Anti-Contact and Subpoena Rules, 53 U. PITr. L. REV. 291, 315-16 (1992);
Rory Little, Who Should Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 355,
359-67 (1996).
10. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
11. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002).
12. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 454 (2009).
13. 536 U.S. 622 (2002).
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particular, (1) efforts to amend the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure to address disclosure of exculpatory and impeachment
evidence that have gathered momentum since the Stevens dismissal
but have been thus far successfully resisted by the Department of
Justice ("DOJ") and (2) calls to amend or interpret attorney conduct
rules to broaden the government's disclosure obligations. In Part IV, I
argue that rules of criminal procedure are a far better vehicle than
state attorney conduct rules to resolve the many competing interests
and tensions at play with regards to impeachment evidence. Contrary
15
14
to the positions taken by Professors McMunigal and Yaroshefsky, I
argue that state disciplinary authorities should not follow the recent
formal opinion of the ABA by adopting broad, burdensome, and
inherently impractical interpretations of their professional conduct
rules. This Part advances institutional competence and legitimacy
arguments in favor of regulating certain questions of prosecutorial
ethics through rules of criminal procedure rather than through rules
of attorney conduct. In Part V, I argue that if any reform is
undertaken, courts should adopt more specific rules of criminal
procedure that categorize the specific types of impeachment material
that must be turned over before a guilty plea.
I. EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court ruled that "the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process.
."16 The Court likened the
withholding of exculpatory evidence by the prosecutor to the knowing
presentation of perjured testimony, which it had previously declared
to violate due process in Mooney v. Holohan.17 According to the Court:
A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if made
available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that
bears heavily on the defendant. That casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a
18
proceeding that does not comport with standards of justice ....

14. Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, ABA Explains Prosecutors' Ethical Disclosure
Duty, 24 CRIM. JUST. 41, 44 (2010); Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty
Plea Process, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 1025-26 (1989).

15.

Ellen Yaroshefsky, Ethics and Plea Bargaining-What'sDiscovery Got to Do With It?, 23

CRIM. JUST. 28, 28 (2008).
16. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
17. Id. at 86 (quoting Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935)).
18. Id. at 87-88. Although the Court's decision in Brady referenced the prosecutor's
constitutional duty to turn over exculpatory evidence "on request" of the defendant, subsequent
cases recognized that this constitutional duty of disclosure exists whether the defendant
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The primary principle supporting the Brady holding is the
"avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused." 19 Nine years after Brady,
the Supreme Court enlarged its construction of constitutionally
"exculpatory" evidence to encompass impeachment evidence.2 0 In
Giglio v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that the government
must disclose to the defendant any promises, rewards, or inducements
made to a government witness in exchange for his testimony that
would be helpful on cross-examination to show bias. 21 Although Giglio
involved a promise of immunity, subsequent cases have made clear
that impeachment material includes more than just agreements not to
prosecute. 22 Brady, Giglio, and their progeny require a prosecutor to
disclose to the defendant any evidence that may be used to impeach a
key government witness on a material point of his testimony. 23 The
Supreme Court has consistently treated impeachment evidence as a
form of "evidence favorable to the accused" subject to the Brady
24
disclosure standards.
of
nondisclosure
when prosecutorial
In determining
exculpatory evidence violates due process, the good faith or bad faith
of the prosecution is irrelevant. 25 The Supreme Court in Kyles v.
Whitley essentially imposed an affirmative duty on the prosecutor to
learn of any exculpatory evidence possessed by anyone "acting on the
government's behalf ' 26 in the case, including government agents
working on the investigative team. 27 Facts known to the police will
specifically requests the withheld material, only generally requests exculpatory information, or
files no discovery requests at all. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (plurality
opinion). In other words, the prosecutor's duty to turn over evidence favorable to the accused is
self-executing; it does not depend on the presence or precision of discovery requests filed by
defense counsel. See id.
19. 373 U.S. at 87.
20. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972).
21. Id.
22. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002) (citing Giglio for the proposition
that exculpatory evidence includes "evidence affecting witness credibility") (internal quotation
marks omitted); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 263 (1999) (requiring disclosure when
evidence is favorable to the accused, "either because it is exculpatory, or because it is
impeaching").
23. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676 (rejecting any constitutional distinction between impeaching
information and exculpatory evidence).
24. When the "reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or
innocence," nondisclosure of evidence "affecting [that witness's] credibility" falls within the
constitutional disclosure rule announced in Brady. Id. at 677 (quoting Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154).
25. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
26. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 418, 437 (1995).
27. Whether an investigating agent will be considered to be a member of the "prosecution
team" for Brady/Giglio purposes is a fact-specific inquiry. See United States v. Meros, 866 F.2d
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thus be imputed to the prosecutor for Brady/Giglio purposes, whether
28
or not the prosecutor had actual knowledge of them.
Brady and its progeny involved exculpatory "evidence,"
contemplating documents or testimony that the defendant could have
used at trial to help establish his innocence or undermine the
government's proof.29 Unsubstantiated tips, inadmissible hearsay,
rumor, and innuendo favorable to the accused typically do not fall
within the Brady disclosure rule, either because they are not
admissible "evidence" or because they are unlikely to have led to
30
evidence that could reasonably alter the trial result.
Evidence will be considered "material" within the meaning of
Brady/Giglio "if there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different." 31 In Kyles, the Supreme Court clarified
this standard, stating that evidence is material if it could "reasonably
be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to
undermine confidence in the verdict."32 The Court explained that a
court reviewing a claim of Brady error need not decide whether the
evidence, if disclosed, would have established innocence, but rather

1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 1989). Not all government investigators will be considered agents of the
prosecutor, if, for example, they work for a different sovereign or are not participating in the case
under investigation. See, e.g., United States v. Reyeros, 537 F.3d 270, 283 (3d Cir. 2008); United
States v. Risha, 445 F.3d 298, 306 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Antone, 603 F.2d 566, 567-68
(5th Cir. 1979).
28. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280-81 (1999) (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438).
29. See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154; Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
30. See Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 11 (1995) (ruling that undisclosed results of
polygraph examinations on government witnesses did not require reversal where polygraph
evidence was inadmissible under state law and defendant's claim that knowledge of results could
have led to admissible evidence or altered cross-examination was based on mere speculation).
There is no uniform approach in the federal courts to the treatment of inadmissible "information"
as the basis for Brady claims. See generally Felder v. Johnson, 180 F.3d 206, 212 & n.7 (5th Cir.
1999) (discussing different approaches taken by circuits and collecting cases). Some circuits and
state supreme courts have ruled that if the withheld evidence was inadmissible, then it cannot
be material under Brady. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 605 F.3d 985, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 2010),
cert. denied, 10-7456, 2010 WL 4604820 (U.S. Dec. 13, 2010); Hoke v. Netherland, 92 F.3d 1350,
1356 n.3 (4th Cir. 1996); Commonwealth v. Lambert, 884 A.2d 848, 857 (Pa. 2005). Other circuits
allow that inadmissible evidence can sometimes be material under Brady, if it could have led to
the discovery of admissible evidence. See, e.g., Ellsworth v. Warden, N.H. State Prison, 333 F.3d
1, 5 (1st Cir. 2003); Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 703 & n.1 (11th Cir. 1999).
31. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). In Bagley, the Court adopted a
uniform standard of materiality to be applied to all instances of undisclosed exculpatory
evidence, irrespective of whether the evidence withheld was specifically requested by the
defendant, only generally requested, or not requested at all. Id.
32. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995).
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"whether in its absence [the defendant] received a fair trial,
33
understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence."
Many scholars have bemoaned the conflation of nondisclosure
and prejudice in one test under Brady, decrying it as an unworkable
standard and a circular spectacle. 34 In order to assess whether a piece
of evidence is constitutionally material and thus subject to mandatory
disclosure under due process standards, the prosecutor must look
ahead to a trial that has not happened yet and predict how an
appellate tribunal might thereafter assess its impact on that
proceeding. 35 In other words, "Brady establishes a retrospective
standard for establishing a prospective obligation."36 Notwithstanding
the conceptual difficulties inherent in this task, the Supreme Court
continues to adhere to materiality as an essential component of the
Brady disclosure obligation. In Strickler, the Court stated that "there
is never a real 'Brady violation' unless the nondisclosure was so
serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed
37
evidence would have produced a different verdict.
Difficulties in applying the Brady materiality standard in any
predictable fashion-coupled with several high-profile instances of
discovery lapses across the country-have led some scholars to call for
abandonment of materiality as an element of a prosecutor's disclosure
obligation.38 The current rhetoric about the failures of Brady seems to
33. Id. at 434.
34. See Bennet L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEx. L. REV. 685
(2006); Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield to New
Realities, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 541, 564; Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional
Mirages: The Tale of Brady v. Maryland, 33 McGEORGE L. REV. 643, 659 (2002).
35. See Daniel S. Medwed, Brady's Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533, 1542
(2010).
36. John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea
Bargaining,50 EMORY L. J. 437, 516 (2001).
37. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999); see United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132,
135 (2d Cir. 2001) ("Brady does not, however, require the prosecution to disclose all exculpatory
and impeachment material; it need disclose only material 'that, if suppressed, would deprive the
defendant of a fair trial.' ") (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985)). See
generally Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting ProsecutorialDisclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 487 (2009).
38. See Jennifer Blasser et al., New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure
Obligations: Report on the Working Group of Best Practices, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1963
(2010) ('The boundaries of the Brady decisions are uncertain and contested; because of the
'materiality' requirement they are not capable of being easily or mechanically applied .... ");
Burke, supra note 37, at 483 (arguing that after 45 years of Brady jurisprudence "the judiciary
has failed to provide coherent guidelines to prosecutors who remain uncertain of the scope of
their disclosure obligations," and advocating for move to open file discovery). See generally
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 699-703 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that materiality standard is
unworkable and prosecutor should be constitutionally required to disclose all evidence favorable
to the defendant).
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range from two extremes: the critics who view prosecutors as zealous
advocates willing to "gamble" by withholding evidence on a close
materiality determination in order to win at all costs 39 or the
apologists who view prosecutors as honest but mistaken partisans
frequently unable to recognize the materiality of exculpatory evidence
due to their own cognitive biases, inexperience thinking from a
40
defense point of view, and/or assimilation into the prosecutorial role.
Whichever form the discourse takes, frustrations with Brady have led
the defense bar to look to rules of criminal procedure and attorney
conduct rules as vehicles for imposing obligations on prosecutors to
disclose evidence favorable to the accused beyond due process
requirements.

II. THE COMPLEX NATURE OF IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE
Impeachment evidence is different from other forms of
exculpatory evidence because it does not directly suggest that the
defendant did not commit the crime; rather, it indirectly supports
innocence (or failure of proof) by undermining the government's
affirmative evidence of guilt. 41 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court treats
evidence affecting credibility as falling within the constitutional
disclosure rule of Brady, which is discussed above. When a key
witness's reliability might be determinative of guilt or innocence,
"nondisclosure of evidence affecting that witness's credibility" falls
within the general rule that suppression of material favorable
42
evidence by the prosecution justifies a new trial.
Impeachment material is any evidence having the potential to
alter the jury's assessment of the credibility of a significant
prosecution witness. 43 It may include prior statements of the witness
that are inconsistent with his anticipated trial testimony; 44 acts of
dishonesty on the part of the witness that could be used to attack the
witness's character for truthfulness under Federal Rule of Evidence

39.

See, e.g., ANGELA J.

DAVIS, ARBITRARY

JUSTICE: THE

POWER OF THE AMERICAN

PROSECUTOR 4, 130-32 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007); Gershman, supranote 34, at 715-22.
40. See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Talking About Prosecutors, 31 CARDOzO L. REV. 2119, 2135
(2010); Prosser, supra note 34, at 569.
41. Douglass, supra note 36, at 497.
42. See United States v. Giglio, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972).
43. See United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Giglio, 405 U.S. at
154-55; Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1459 (9th Cir. 1995); Goins v.
Commonwealth, 470 S.E.2d 114, 124 (Va. 1996).
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608(b) or a corollary state evidentiary rule;45 evidence that reveals
46
that a witness has a bias, motive, or interest against the accused;
and evidence of promises made or rewards paid to a government
witness in exchange for his cooperation and testimony. 47 Some
evidence may be both factually exculpatory and impeaching, such as a
witness's early identification of someone other than the defendant as
the perpetrator or a prior inconsistent statement of the witness
48
exculpating the defendant from participation in the crime.
To appreciate the potential elasticity of the impeachment
concept, consider the hypothetical scenarios described below:
Scenario 1: The alleged victim of a sexual assault gives several
sequential interviews to a sexual assault nurse examiner, to a police
officer, and later to the prosecutor as she prepares for grand jury
testimony. The victim knew her alleged attacker because they had
previously worked in the same office and the attack occurred after a
company social event. Minor details of the victim's story change over
the course of several interviews, including times, a description of the
defendant's clothing and the words spoken by the defendant
immediately preceding the attack. One composite report is written by
the police officer after the details are clarified over the course of
several interviews, although the police officer's notes reflect some of
the discrepancies.
Scenario 2: The victim of a robbery at knifepoint outside an
automated teller machine ("ATM") later identifies his attacker from
both a photo array and lineup. The victim was with three companions
at the time of the attack, and each bystander also picked the
defendant out of a photo array. One of the bystander witnesses had
spent the earlier part of the evening at a party drinking alcohol.
Scenario 3: Defendant is charged with bank fraud for
overstating his assets in several commercial real estate loans that

45. See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 35 F.3d 929, 936 (4th Cir. 1994).
46. See, e.g., Berry v. Oswalt, 143 F.3d 1127, 1132 (8th Cir. 1998).
47. See, e.g., Tassin v. Cain, 517 F.3d 770, 778 (5th Cir. 2008); Bell v. Bell, 512 F.3d 223,
244 (6th Cir. 2008).
48. See, e.g., Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 78-79 (1981) (vacating and remanding because
undisclosed police report revealed victim had previously said only two of three defendants raped
her); Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278, 291-92 (1st Cir. 2006) (affirming vacation of plea
and sentence in organized crime prosecution where government failed to turn over recantation
by key witness of claim that defendant had given him permission to kill one victim). As I will
argue below, the greater includes the lesser: where evidence is both factually exculpatory and
impeaching, it is perfectly appropriate to treat it as exculpatory for purposes of Rule 3.8(d) and
pertinent rules of criminal procedure, and to require its disclosure prior to a guilty plea absent
waiver. My argument in this paper addresses only evidence that is purely impeaching.
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subsequently defaulted. The FBI agent leading the investigation has
been accused of violating bureau policies with respect to confidential
informants when he previously worked for the organized crime strike
force. These allegations have not yet been substantiated or resolved,
but the prosecutor is aware of the ongoing internal investigation.
Scenario 4: The elderly victim of a mugging at night picked the
defendant out of a photo array and a lineup. As the prosecutor
prepares the victim to testify at trial, the victim appears hesitant. She
is very nervous about testifying and states that she is not sure
whether she will be able to identify her attacker in the courtroom. As
she prepares to leave the prosecutor's office, she states that she cannot
remember where she parked her car.
Scenario 5: After a barroom fight, defendant is charged with
assault and battery with a dangerous weapon (a beer bottle). The
victim was hospitalized after the attack for severe contusions and
lacerations. Responding officers interviewed several patrons at the bar
who claim to have witnessed the argument and fight leading up to the
alleged assault. One of the patrons tells a police officer that she "heard
that the victim is a serious pothead."
Each of these scenarios presents one or more potential avenues
for impeachment. As will be explored below, however, whether or not
the information needs to be disclosed during discovery under
prevailing constitutional norms is far from clear and will depend upon
several factors; including, (1) whether the government intends to call
the potential witness at trial; (2) how central that witness's testimony
is likely to be in proving an element of the government's case in light
of other available avenues of proof; (3) how strongly the particular
form of impeachment is likely to undercut the witness's credibility in
the minds of the jury; (4) whether the impeaching information is in
the form of admissible evidence or inadmissible hearsay; and (5)
whether the defendant opts for a trial or decides to plead guilty.
"Materiality" is more difficult to assess for impeachment
evidence than it is for classically exculpatory evidence. With respect to
the latter, the Brady standard asks the prosecutor to assess whether
the exculpatory evidence, if made known to the jury, could have had
any reasonable probability of affecting the outcome of the trial in light
of other evidence of the defendant's guilt. Prudent prosecutors are
urged to resolve doubtful cases in favor of disclosure.4 9 With
impeachment evidence, however, the prosecutor's task is far more
nuanced. The prosecutor must first assess the centrality of the witness
49.

Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995).
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to the government's proof in light of the entire case. Then, she must
assess what particular aspect of the witness's testimony is likely to be
impeached and the importance of that evidence; that is, is it a general
form of impeachment intended to undermine the witness's credibility
as to all aspects of his testimony (such as a prior criminal conviction or
promise of immunity), or is it a specific form of impeachment that will
likely be used by the defendant to undermine the witness's testimony
on a particular point (such as a prior inconsistent statement)? Finally,
the prosecutor must assess how powerfully the particular form of
impeachment undermines the witness's credibility. For example, a
prior act of dishonesty twenty years old that could be used to impeach
the witness under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) (such as a youthful
indiscretion of cheating or stealing) may be less probative of credibility
than a more recent or more serious fabrication. For these reasons,
appellate courts assessing post-conviction claims of undisclosed
impeachment evidence struggle with the materiality issue and often
produce split opinions. 50 If anything, their task-conducting a review
of a completed trial record to determine if the proceedings were fair in
50. See United States v. Madori, 419 F.3d 159, 169-70 (2d Cir. 2005) (majority concludes
that testifying codefendant's undisclosed cooperation with the government in another
investigation was not material in the context of entire case); Wilson v. Whitley, 28 F.3d 433, 43942, 443 (5th Cir. 1994) (reversing grant of habeas corpus petition in state armed robbery
prosecution where state failed to disclose police interview report with victim describing
circumstances of attack and direction from which robbers approached; majority terms it a "close"
and "extremely difficult" question of materiality, but ultimately concludes that defendant was
not deprived of a fair trial; dissent concludes the report was material because it affected sole
identifying witness's opportunity to view his assailants); Britson v. Lewis, No. 87-2815, 1988 WL
131765, at *6, *8 (9th Cir. Nov. 29, 1988) (affirming denial of habeas corpus petition in state first
degree murder prosecution where prosecutor failed to turn over statement which would have
enabled defense to locate impeachment witness who could have testified to drinking with critical
eyewitness earlier on day of murder; dissent argues that impeachment on basis of inebriation
could have undermined testimony "fundamental to the prosecution's case"); Garrison v. Maggio,
540 F.2d 1271, 1274 (5th Cir. 1976) (undisclosed supplemental police report revealed
inconsistent statement by robbery victim about height and build of perpetrator; dissent argues it
was material and could have created reasonable doubt); State v. Curtis, 384 So. 2d 396, 398-99
(La. 1980) (failure of sole eyewitness to shooting to identify defendant from earlier photo array
was materially impeaching of in-court identification; dissent disagrees based on strength of other
evidence in the case); State v. Carter, 449 A.2d 1280, 1306 (N.J. 1982) (Clifford, J., dissenting on
issue of whether inconsistency between polygraph examiner's oral report and written report was
material); Hartman v. State, 896 S.W.2d 94, 102, 112-13 (Tenn. 1995) (majority concludes that
evidence prisoner was paid $1000 to convince other inmate to testify against defendant not
material within meaning of Brady, but dissent argues that fact that witness refused to speak
with or provide any information to the state until after payment was made to a third person was
"seriously damaging to his credibility and highly material"); see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S.
263, 301 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (dissenting on materiality of officer's undisclosed notes of
interview with key witness: "Even keeping in mind these caveats about the appropriate level of
materiality, applying the standard to the facts of this case does not give the Court easy answers,
as the Court candidly acknowledges.").
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light of all the circumstances-is easier than the task a prosecutor
faces prior to trial before the defense attorney's strategy and trial
theory have been laid bare.
Returning to the hypotheticals posed above, I suspect that most
conscientious prosecutors would agree that the inconsistent
statements made by the victim to the alleged acquaintance rape in
Scenario 1 are impeachment evidence that must be disclosed under
Brady. The real challenge for prosecutors in these situations is to
make sure that there are mechanisms in place to capture
inconsistencies reflected in sequential interviews because, under
Brady, information possessed by government agents will be imputed
to the prosecutor. 51 I further suspect that there would be widespread
disagreement over whether the impeachment information in Scenarios
2 through 5 must be disclosed. If the government does not intend to
call the third bystander to the ATM robbery as a witness in Scenario
2, then his potential intoxication is irrelevant. If the hearsay rumor
that the victim of the attack in Scenario 5 was a drug user is not based
on first-hand knowledge, then it is not "evidence" that would likely fall
within the Brady rule. 52 Because the alleged police misconduct in
Scenario 3 has not been substantiated, the prosecutor might not
believe that it would be admissible to impeach the agent at trial. The
strength of the possible impeachment with regard to the victim's
memory in Scenario 4 might be so slight that the prosecutor does not
reasonably believe it would rise to the level of "material" evidence,
especially in light of countervailing concerns for the victim's privacy.
While conscientious prosecutors might heed the Supreme Court's
admonition and "err on the side of transparency"5 3 by disclosing these
four avenues of impeachment prior to trial, these very same
prosecutors might change their calculus dramatically were the
defendants in each case to plead guilty.
It is these very complexities with regard to impeachment
evidence that led the Supreme Court in 2002 to conclude that the
Constitution does not require a prosecutor to turn over impeachment
material before a guilty plea. Prior to Ruiz, the Supreme Court had
51. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437. See discussion of Ogden Memo, infra at notes 96-103 and
accompanying text, wherein federal prosecutors are encouraged to have agents memorialize
witness interviews other than trial preparation sessions, and preserve their notes. See also
Robert P. Mosteller, The Special Threat of Informants to the Innocent Who are not Innocents:
Producing "FirstDrafts,"Recording Incentives, and Taking a Fresh Look at the Evidence, 6 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 519, 565-70 (2009) (recommending legislation that would require law enforcement
officers to preserve all first drafts of informant interviews).
52. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
53. Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1783 n.15 (2009).

1442

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 64:5:1429

never explicitly addressed the timing requirement of Brady
disclosures. 54 While the Court's opinion in Ruiz might have confused
that timing issue more than it helped illumine it with regard to
"classically" exculpatory evidence, 55 the Court nevertheless was quite
clear about the low value it ascribed to impeachment evidence at the
plea bargaining stage of a criminal proceeding.
In Ruiz, the Court ruled that the fair trial guarantees of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendment were not violated where the government
conditioned a fast-track plea offer on the defendant's waiver of her
57
right to impeachment information. 56 Writing for a unanimous court,
54. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002); United States v. Beckford, 962 F.
Supp. 780, 785 (E.D. Va. 1997) (quoting United States v. Anderson, 481 F.2d 685, 690 n.2 (4th
Cir. 1973), aff'd, 417 U.S. 211 (1974)). The Supreme Court in Strickler cited as justification for
the exculpatory evidence obligation "the special role played by the American prosecutor in the
search for truth in criminal trials." 527 U.S. at 281 (emphasis added). The language invoked by
the Court in Kyles, Bagley, and Agurs discussing the evidence's likely impact on the trial
proceedings also suggests that Brady material must be disclosed prior to trial, or at least early
enough during the trial for the defendant to make effective use of it at that proceeding. See Kyles,
514 U.S. at 434; United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1986); United States v. Bagley, 473
U.S. 667, 675 (1985). Some circuits have confronted this timing issue in explicating the
relationship between Brady and the Jencks Act, which is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) and
requires federal prosecutors to turn over a witness's statements after that witness has testified
on direct examination. A potential conflict between the Jencks Act and Brady arises where a
written, recorded or adopted statement of a witness contains exculpatory information, such as
impeachment material or evidence suggesting factual innocence. Some circuits have ruled that
where evidence is both Brady and Jencks material, disclosure after the witness has testified on
direct examination pursuant to Jencks meets the timeliness requirement of Brady. See, e.g.,
United States v. Presser, 844 F.2d 1275, 1283 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Jones, 612 F.2d
453, 455 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Scott, 524 F.2d 465, 467 (5th Cir. 1975). Other circuits
have ruled that the due process concerns of Brady might, under certain circumstances, require
pretrial disclosure of Jencks Act material. See, e.g., United States v. Rittweger, 524 F.3d 171, 181
n.4 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v.
Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
55. See United States v. Buendo, 701 F. Supp. 937, 939-40 (D. Mass. 1988), affd sub nom.
United States v. Penta, 923 F.2d 839 (1st Cir. 1990) (distinguishing classic exculpatory evidence
from impeachment evidence).
56. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 633. It is important to recognize the unique procedural context in
which Ruiz arose, because the Court addressed the Brady doctrine's application to guilty pleas in
a case that presented that issue only indirectly. Kevin C. McMunigal, Guilty Pleas, Brady
Disclosure,and Wrongful Convictions, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 651, 663-64 (2007). In response
to a large volume of narcotics trafficking arrests in the southwestern part of the United States,
several United States Attorneys' Offices in the 1990s developed a so-called "fast track" plea
system whereby defendants waived their right to indictment, their right to file pretrial motions,
their right to certain discovery, and their right to contest deportation proceedings in exchange for
sentencing concessions. Ruiz was offered such a fast-track agreement upon her arrest for
transporting thirty kilograms of marijuana into the United States, but she rejected it. She later
pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a longer period of incarceration than she would have been
under the proposed fast track plea agreement (18 to 24 months as opposed to 12 to 18 months).
Following her conviction, Ruiz claimed that the conditions of the fast track plea agreement were
unconstitutional because they required her to forego her rights to Brady material, and that she
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Justice Breyer concluded that Brady does not require the government
to turn over impeachment evidence 58 or evidence supporting possible
affirmative defenses (e.g., insanity, self-defense, entrapment) prior to
a guilty plea. The Court rested its reasoning primarily on concerns for
the efficient administration of justice, determining that the costs of
such disclosure would far outweigh its benefits to the accused. 59 If
impeachment material must be tracked down and disclosed to a
defendant prior to a guilty plea, one of the government's primary
incentives for engaging in plea bargaining-disposing of cases simply
and quickly-would be eliminated. The Court stated that such a
construction of a defendant's due process rights could "require the
Government to devote substantially more resources to trial
preparation prior to plea bargaining, thereby depriving 60 the pleabargaining process of its main resource-saving advantages."
Moreover, the Court considered impeachment information
particularly important "in relation to the fairness of a trial, not in

should have been provided the two-level downward departure recommended by the government
in the proposed fast-track plea agreement. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, ruling
that a guilty plea cannot be considered knowing and voluntary if it is made without knowledge of
Brady material withheld by the prosecutor, and that the Constitution therefore prohibits a
waiver of the sort proposed by the government in United States v. Ruiz. 241 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th
Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court could have resolved the case by assuming without deciding that
all forms of Brady material must be turned over prior to a guilty plea, and resting its decision
simply on the ground that such a constitutional right, like others, could be waived by the
defendant. But the Court did not limit its opinion to the consideration of waivability. Instead,
Justice Breyer's opinion addressed the disclosure obligation directly, and held that under Brady
defendants have no constitutional right to disclosure of information relevant to either
impeachment or affirmative defenses prior to a guilty plea. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 633. Evidence
supporting factual innocence was not waived or alleged to have been withheld in Ruiz, so the
Court did not address whether a waiver of this most substantial form of exculpatory evidence
was enforceable, or whether a plea of guilty in the face of its nondisclosure could later be
vacated. See id. at 631.
57. Justice Thomas concurred only in the judgment, seeming to suggest that, because Brady
was intended to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial, it may have no application whatsoever
to a prosecutor's discovery obligations prior to a guilty plea. See Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 633-34
(Thomas, J., concurring).
58. The Court reached the same conclusion with regard to evidence supporting affirmative
defenses (e.g., insanity, self-defense, entrapment). In one short paragraph at the end of the Ruiz
opinion, and without undertaking a separate analysis of just how probative affirmative defense
evidence may be of innocence or the costs/benefits of mandating its disclosure prior to a guilty
plea, the Court equated affirmative defense evidence with impeachment evidence, and concluded
that the two should be treated similarly for the purposes of due process clause analysis. Id. at
633. Discussion of a prosecutor's ethical obligations with regard to affirmative defense evidence
is beyond the scope of this article.
59. Id. at 631.
60. Id. at 632.
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respect to whether a plea is voluntary."61 Since the Court has never
created a constitutional right to discovery in criminal cases, during
plea negotiations the prosecutor has no constitutional duty to disclose
incriminatingevidence to the accused (although she may have every
strategic incentive to do so to encourage a plea). 62 Because disclosure
of inculpatory evidence is not constitutionally mandated, the Court
reasoned that it made little sense to impose a constitutional duty on
the prosecutor to disclose evidence that tends to undercut such
affirmative proof.63 The value of impeachment information to
defendants during plea negotiations varies with their awareness of the
prosecutor's case in chief, which the Court characterized as "random"
and not a matter of constitutional concern. 64 Finally, the Court felt
that imposing a duty to disclose impeachment material prior to a
guilty plea could reveal the identity of informants and undercover
agents and jeopardize the physical safety and security of other
potential witnesses who might be subject to tampering or
intimidation. These risks had already been addressed by Congress
through the carefully drawn witness statement disclosure
requirements of the Jenks Act, which mandates the disclosure of
certain witness statements only after the witness has testified on
65
direct examination.
Whether and how much of the Brady doctrine survives Ruiz in
the context of guilty pleas remains uncertain. It is abundantly clear
that the Supreme Court has severely restricted Brady's role in preplea
discovery, 66 if it did not eliminate it altogether. 67 There remains a
narrow opening for the Court to rule that due process requires a
prosecutor to disclose evidence supporting factual innocence prior to a
guilty plea or that an express waiver of such evidence as a legal
matter cannot possibly be knowing and voluntary due to the centrality
61. Id. at 629 (internal parenthetical omitted).
62. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1997).
63. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629, 633.
64. Id. at 623.
65. Id. at 631-32.
66. McMunigal, supra note 56, at 664.
67. Whether the Supreme Court will develop any future theory to require preplea
disclosures of evidence bearing on factual innocence remains to be seen. It has certainly left open
the possibility of ruling that Brady is merely a trial right and does not apply at all to the plea
bargaining context. Some circuits since Ruiz have ruled that Brady is a trial right and that even
evidence that supports factual innocence need not be disclosed prior to a change of plea,
reminiscent of Justice Thomas's concurrence in Ruiz. See, e.g., United States v. Conroy, 567 F.3d
174, 179 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1502 (2010); see also United States v. Mathur,
624 F.3d 498, 507 (1st Cir. 2010) (dictum); United States v. Moussauoui, 591 F.3d 263, 285 (4th
Cir. 2010) (dictum).
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of such information to the defendant's exercise of volition. 68 With
regard to impeachment information, however, the Court was clear and
spoke with one voice: due process does not require its disclosure by the
prosecution prior to a guilty plea, irrespective of materiality and
irrespective of the presence or absence of an express waiver.

III. POST-RUIZ DEVELOPMENTS: REACTION BEGETS COUNTERREACTION

When the Constitution fails, try legislation.6 9 Since Ruiz,
members of the profession who believe that more fulsome disclosures
will enhance the fairness and accuracy of guilty pleas have shifted
their lobbying efforts toward bar disciplinary authorities and the
drafters of rules of criminal procedure.7 0 The DOJ has strategically
forestalled efforts to amend Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure by issuing a series of pointed directives providing guidance
to federal prosecutors about their discovery obligations and, in limited
circumstances, by requiring disclosure slightly beyond the
requirements of Brady. But the Department has not made any
significant concessions on impeachment evidence. An impasse seems
imminent, if not already at hand. Now the ABA Standing Committee
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility has stepped into the fray to
propose a broad new interpretation of Model Rule 3.8(d) that has
significant implications for discovery in the guilty plea context. Each
of these developments will be discussed in turn.
A. FederalRule of CriminalProcedure 16
Efforts by the trial bar to amend Rule 1671 began very soon
after the Ruiz decision. In 2003 the American College of Trial Lawyers
68. Some federal courts after Ruiz have allowed defendants to challenge the voluntariness
of their guilty pleas based on the failure of the government to disclose evidence supporting
factual innocence. See Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278, 294 (1st Cir. 2006) (explaining
that failure to disclose evidence may be sufficiently outrageous to constitute the conduct that is
needed to ground a challenge to the validity of a guilty plea); United States v. Lestrick, 82 F.
App'x 4, 6 (10th Cir. 2003) (unpublished opinion) ("[U]nder certain limited circumstances, the
prosecution's violation of Brady can render a defendant's plea involuntary.") (quoting United
States v. Wright, 43 F.3d 491, 496 (10th Cir. 1994)).

69. See Barry Tarlow, Brady/Giglio Disclosures: Beware of Prosecutors Bearing Gifts, 30
CHAMPION 60, 70 (2006).
70. See McMunigal, supra note 56, at 670.
71. Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, as presently written, does not
mention exculpatory evidence. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. Indeed, the primary focus of the Rule is on
disclosure to the accused of inculpatory evidence intended to be relied on by the government at
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("ACTL") proposed modifying Rule 16 to impose a duty on the
government to disclose any "information favorable to the defendant"
within fourteen days of request by the accused. 72 The ACTL proposal
would also have created a requirement of due diligence by the
prosecutor in collecting favorable information from government
agents. A corresponding amendment to Rule 11 would have required
any favorable information subject to disclosure under Rule 16(f) to be
disclosed to the defendant fourteen days prior to a guilty plea. The
combined effect of these amendments would have been to dispense
with the materiality element of Brady and to reverse the effect of Ruiz
in terms of disclosure of impeachment evidence and evidence
supporting affirmative defenses before a change of plea. 73 The scope of
impeachment information that would be subject to preplea disclosure
under the ACTL proposal was thus incredibly broad. ACTL's proposal
never received the recommendation of the Advisory Committee on
74
Criminal Rules.
In 2006 a second proposal to amend Rule 16 made it out of the
Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules and onto the agenda of the
Standing Committee of Rules of Practice and Procedure for the U.S.
Judicial Conference. By an 8-4 vote, the Advisory Committee on
September 5, 2006, recommended requiring federal prosecutors in
criminal cases to disclose to the defense upon request "all exculpatory
and impeaching information. ' 75 The effect of this amendment would
have been to require prosecutors to turn over all exculpatory and
impeachment evidence without regard to materiality, absent waiver
by the defendant or a protective order of the court. 76 However, the
trial and thus "material to preparing the defense" of the accused. See id. Specific evidence
mandated for disclosure by the government upon the request of the defendant under Rule 16
includes written or recorded statements of the defendant; the substance of oral statements of the
defendant made to government agents upon interrogation; the defendant's prior criminal record;
documents, objects and tangible things the government intends to use at trial in its case in chief,
reports of physical examinations and scientific tests; and, a written summary of expected expert
testimony. Id. Unlike discovery rules in many states, Rule 16 does not require federal
prosecutors to turn over a witness list prior to trial. Id. Congress has required the government to
disclose its list of witnesses before trial only in capital cases. See 18 U.SC. § 3432 (2006).
72. American College of Trial Lawyers, Proposed Codification of Disclosure of Favorable
Information Under FederalRules of CriminalProcedure 11 and 16, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 93, 95
(2004).

73. See id. at 115-16.
74. Yaroshefsky, supra note 15, at 28.
75. See Stephen Spivack, David Roth & Daniel Golden, Troubling the Heavens: The
Productionof Evidence Favorableto Defendants by the United States, 30 CHAMPION 24 (2010).
76.

LAUREL HOOPER & SHELIA THORPE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., BRADY V. MARYLAND MATERIAL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 23 (May 2007), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/

pdf.nsf/lookupibradyma2.pdfJ$file/bradyma2.pdf.
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proposed amendment effectively preserved the result in Ruiz by
authorizing the withholding of impeachment material, at least where
the defendant pleaded guilty well in advance of the scheduled trial
date. The second sentence of the 2006 proposal provided that "[t]he
court may not order disclosure of impeachment information earlier
than 14 days before trial."77 Notwithstanding this limitation, the DOJ
strongly opposed the amendment to Rule 16 because it would extend
disclosure requirements beyond Brady and create conflicts between
Rule 16 and the Jencks Act. 78 The Department argued instead that
modifications to the U.S. Attorneys' Manual might help clarify and
bring uniformity to federal prosecutors' discovery practices across the
country. 79 The Standing Committee took no action on the Advisory
Committee's 2006 recommendation, deciding to not publish it for
80
public comment and to table further consideration indefinitely.
In truth, the amendments to the U.S. Attorneys' Manual that
successfully forestalled rules reform in 2006 did very little to alter
prevailing practice with respect to the disclosure of impeachment
evidence. First, the Manual is advisory only and creates no
enforceable rights in federal court.8 1 But more importantly, what it
purports to give with one hand (the promotion of disclosures beyond
Brady), it takes away with the other. The Manual claims to require
disclosures beyond those constitutionally mandated in three respects:
(1) by requiring disclosure of exculpatory and impeachment
"information,"regardless of whether such information is in the form of
admissible evidence; 2 (2) by requiring disclosure of such information
"regardless of whether it is intended to make the difference between
conviction and acquittal of the defendant for a charged crime";8 3 and
(3) with regard to classically exculpatory information, by requiring

77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id. at 6. See discussion supra note 54 and infra note 212 and accompanying text.
Ellen S. Podgor, PleadingBlindly, 80 MISS. L.J. 1633 (2011).

80. SUMMARY OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE 29-30 (Sept. 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/
rules/Reports/ST09-2007.pdf. The Standing Committee deferred further consideration of the
proposed amendment in part based on its desire "to obtain information about the experience with
the Department of Justice's recent revisions to its U.S. Attorneys' Manual." Id. at 29.
81. See Spivack, Roth & Golden, supra note 75, at 25 n.22 and cases cited. See also U.S.
ATT'YS' MAN. § 9-5.001(F) ("This expanded disclosure policy, however, does not create a general
right of discovery in criminal cases. Nor does it provide defendants with any additional rights or
remedies."), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia.reading_room/usam/title9/
5mcrm.htm.
82. U.S. ATT'ys'MAN., supra note 81, § 9-5.001(C)(3).
83. § 9-5.001(C)(1), (2).
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disclosure "reasonably promptly after it is discovered." 84 On the
subject of impeachment information,8 5 however, the policy takes a very
curious turn. Having ostensibly abandoned materiality as a
consideration for federal prosecutors with the language cited above,
the Manual later reintroduces concepts of materiality with regard to
impeachment information by suggesting that a prosecutor should
disclose the following: information that casts "substantialdoubt upon
the accuracy of any evidence . . . the prosecutor intends to rely on to
prove an element of any crime" and information that "might have a
8' 6
significant bearing on the admissibility of prosecution evidence."
These italicized words clearly indicate some threshold level of
importance or likely causal impact.8 7 Moreover, with regard to the
timing of impeachment disclosures, the Manual recognizes that what
constitutes impeachment evidence depends on the prosecutor's
decision "on who is or may be called as a government witness," so that
disclosure of this category of information may be made closer to trial,
at trial, or even in camera, if the interests of witness security or
national security so require.8 8 As a practical matter, therefore, the
revisions to the Manual make very few changes to discovery with
regard to disclosure of impeachment information; they certainly do not
either abandon a materiality element altogether or upset the Ruiz
determination that impeachment evidence need not be turned over
9
prior to a guilty plea.8
84. § 9-5.001(D)(1).
85. The preface to section 9-5.100 states that "[tihe exact parameters of potential
impeachment information are not easily determined" but "may include ... (a) specific instances
of conduct of a witness for the purpose of attacking the witness' credibility or character for
truthfulness; (b) evidence in the form of opinion or reputation as to a witness' character for
truthfulness; (c) prior inconsistent statements; and (d) information that may be used to suggest a
witness is biased." § 9-5.100.
86. §9.5.001(C)(2) (emphasis added).
87. In fact, the U.S. Attorneys' Manual unapologetically reintroduces concepts of
materiality after purporting to abandon them in the immediately preceding sentence. See § 95.001(C) ("This policy requires disclosure by prosecutors of information beyond which is
'material' to guilt .... .The
policy recognizes, however, that a trial should not involve
consideration of information, which is irrelevant or not significantly probative of the issues
before the court and should not involve spurious issues or arguments which serve to direct the
pretrial process from examining the genuine issues. Information that goes only to such matters
does not advance the purpose of a trial and thus in not subject to disclosure." (citations omitted)).
88. See § 9-5.001(D)(2) (citing Jencks Act); § 9-5.001(A) (citing Classified Information
Procedures Act).
89. Arguably, the flow of information from investigative agents to the prosecutor was
improved somewhat by section 9-5.001, which requires any law enforcement agency within the
Department of Justice (DOJ) to provide impeachment material to Assistant U.S. Attorneys, to
appoint a designated supervisor to receive requests for impeachment material, and to establish a
system for collecting and producing it. § 9-5.001.
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On the heels of the dismissal of the Stevens case in 2009, the
presiding judge in that case, Judge Emmet G. Sullivan, wrote a letter
to the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules trying to breathe new
life into proposals to amend Rule 16. Citing the history of high-profile
Brady violations in federal court and the Supreme Court's admonition
that "the prudent prosecutor [should] err on the side of transparency,
resolving doubtful questions in favor of disclosure," 90 Judge Sullivan
called for amending Rule 16 to require disclosure of "all exculpatory
and impeachment information" to the defense without regard to
materiality and irrespective of any specific request from the accused. 9 1
Unlike the 2006 proposed amendment, the effect of Judge Sullivan's
proposal, if enacted, would have been to require disclosure of all
impeachment evidence known to the government before a guilty
plea,92 unless expressly waived by the defendant. In October 2009
Assistant Attorney General and Chief of the Criminal Division Lanny
Breuer addressed the Committee and indicated that, although the
DOJ would not object to amending Rule 16 to codify the government's
Brady obligations, it objected strenuously to any proposed amendment
of the rule that would extend Brady as to either scope (e.g.,
93
materiality) or timing.
At least partly in an effort to blunt the momentum for Rule 16
reform spurred by the Stevens dismissal, 94 in 2009 Attorney General
Eric Holder appointed a task force of experienced prosecutors,
investigative agents, and information technology professionals from
the DOJ to study discovery practices in federal criminal cases. 95
Following this study, on January 4, 2010, Deputy Attorney General
David Ogden issued an updated directive to federal prosecutors
addressing their disclosure obligations (hereinafter the "Ogden
90. Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1783 n.15 (2009).
91. Letter from Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan to Hon. Richard C. Tallman, Chair, Judicial
Conference Advisory Comm. on the Rules of Criminal Procedure (Apr. 28, 2009), available at
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/exhibit-b---judge-sullivan-letter.pdf.
92. It is clear from the context of Judge Sullivan's April 2010 letter that he uses the term
"exculpatory evidence" in its broad sense to include impeachment evidence, because he quotes a
section from the transcript of the hearing to set aside the Steven's verdict in which the
prosecutor acknowledges that the failure to turn over a variance in the statement of government
witness Bill Allen was Giglio material. See id. and discussion infra note 277 and accompanying
text.
93. Joe Palazzolo, Justice Department Opposes Expanded Brady Rule, MAIN JUSTICE (Oct.
15, 2009, 12:43 AM), http://www.mainjustice.com/2009/10/15/justice-department-opposesexpanded-brady-rule/.
94. See United States v. Jones, 620 F. Supp.2d 163, 171 (D. Mass. 2009) (describing "ardent
and successful" efforts by Department of Justice to defeat proposed amendments to Rule 16).
95. Podgor, supra note 79, at 1.
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Memo"). 96 The Ogden Memo was intended to "establish a methodical
approach to consideration of discovery obligations ...to avoid lapses
that can result in consequences adverse to the Department's pursuit of
justice." 97 Although it reiterates the DOJ's previously stated policy in
the 2006 U.S. Attorneys' Manual revisions that disclosure of
98
exculpatory evidence should be broader than due process safeguards,
the primary focus of the directive is on better training and supervision
of prosecutors. 99 Its sole real innovations are (1) to call on discovery
coordinators in each U.S. Attorney's Office to conduct annual training
and serve as on-location advisors for trial attorneys; 100 (2) to direct
individual prosecutors to be vigilant in gathering and reviewing
potentially discoverable information from the files of investigative
agencies, including emails and handwritten notes of agents;' 01 and (3)
to provide a useful checklist for line attorneys of potentially
discoverable information. 10 2 The Ogden Memo certainly breaks no new
ground with respect to the timing or scope of impeachment
disclosures 0 3 or the ability of prosecutors to seek waivers of such
discovery as a condition of a plea agreement.' 0 4 On the contrary, the
Memo lists a number of "countervailing" considerations that might
justify federal prosecutors' departure from the Memo's stated
presumption of "broad and early" discovery, including protecting
victims and witnesses from intimidation or harassment, protecting the
96. The "Ogden Memo" is actually a series of three memoranda issued by Deputy Attorney
General Ogden on the same day: a "Summary" of actions taken in response to the report of the
working group, a "Directive" to all United States Attorneys and Heads of Department Litigating
Components Handling Criminal Matters, and a "Memorandum for Department Prosecutors." See
Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att'y Gen., to Dep't Prosecutors (Jan. 4, 2010)
[hereinafter Summary of Actions Memo] (regarding "Issuance of Guidance and Summary of
Actions Taken in Response to the Report of the [DOJ] Criminal Discovery and Case Management
Working Group"), available at http://www.justice.gov/dagtdag-memo.pdf; Memorandum from
David W. Ogden, Deputy Att'y Gen., to Heads of Dep't Litigating Components and all U.S. Att'ys
(Jan. 4, 2010) (regarding "Requirement for Office Discovery Policies in Criminal Matters"),
available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/dag-to-usas-component-heads.pdf; Memorandum from
David W. Ogden, Deputy Att'y Gen., to Dep't Prosecutors (Jan. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Main Memo]
(regarding "Guidance for Prosecutors Regarding Criminal Discovery"), available at
http://www.justice.gov/dag/discovery-guidance.pdf.
97. Main Memo, supranote 96, at 1.
98. Id. at 7.
99. See Green, supranote 6, at 2163.
100. See Main Memo, supranote 96, at 9; Summary of Actions Memo, supra note 96, at 3.
101. Main Memo, supra note 96, at 4-6.
102. Id. at 3-7.
103. As a further example of how the DOJ continues to adhere to a materiality standard for
impeachment disclosures, see id. at 7-8, where prosecutors are urged to memorialize and turn
over "material variances" in a witness's statement.
104. Podgor, supra note 79, at 12.
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privacy interests of witnesses, protecting privileged information,
protecting the integrity of ongoing investigations, and protecting
105
national security interests.
It appears that the DOJ's focus on heightened training and

clarified discovery policies may once again have been successful at
forestalling Rule 16 reform. At its April 11-12, 2011, meeting in
Portland, Oregon, the Advisory Committee considered a "discussion
draft" of a proposed amendment to Rule 16 prepared by its Chair,
10 6
Judge Richard C. Tallman of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The draft would have required prosecutors to turn over all
"exculpatory" information to the defense at least fourteen days before
trial and all "impeachment" information to the defense at least seven
days before trial. 107 Exculpatory information was defined as any
information "inconsistent with any element of any crime charged
against the defendant or that establishes a recognized affirmative
defense," significantly excluding any materiality element.108
Impeachment information was defined as information "that casts
substantial doubt upon the accuracy of any witness testimony that the
government intends to rely on to prove an element of any crime
charged."' 0 9 The discussion draft gave prosecutors the unreviewable
option to withhold discovery if they filed an ex parte affidavit under
seal explaining why the government believed in good faith that such
pretrial disclosure would "threaten the safety of witnesses, victims, or
the public; jeopardize national security; or lead to obstruction of
justice." 0 Notwithstanding the presence of this escape valve,
Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer once again filed a letter
with the Advisory Committee opposing the discussion draft."'
Breuer's primary objections in this letter were that the Department's
"comprehensive steps" to improve discovery practices within the
Department had already "resulted in dramatic and positive change"; 1 2
that "expanding the scope of required prosecutorial disclosure" was
105. Main Memo, supra note 96, at 9.
106. ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, AGENDA BOOK, APR. 11-12, 2001 MEETING,
availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts[RulesandPolicies/rules/Agenda
%20Books/Criminal/CR2011-04.pdf. [hereinafter "AGENDA BOOK"].
107. Memorandum from Hon. Richard C. Tallman to Criminal Rules Advisory Comm. (Mar.
25, 2011), in AGENDA BOOK, supra note 106, tab IlI.C, at 6.
108. Id.
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 7.
111. Letter from Lanny Breuer to Hon. Richard Tallman (Mar. 18, 2011), in AGENDA BOOK,
supranote 106, tab III.C, at 5.
112. Id. at 4.
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the wrong approach to ensuring that prosecutors meet their current
constitutional disclosure obligations; 13 and that the definition of
impeachment information "would require decades of litigation to
clarify what categories... meet the new definition."' 114 Once again, the
potential elasticity of the impeachment concept seemed to be a
primary sticking point for the DOJ: Breuer argued that the new rule
would "create tremendous uncertainty" and "expose witnesses to
greater intrusions into their safety and privacy." 115 After a spirited
and contentious meeting, the Advisory Committee voted 6-5 not to go
116
forward with any proposed amendment to Rule 16 this year.
Given that over fifty percent of federal judges and ninety
percent of defense attorneys recently surveyed by the Federal Judicial
Center favor some form of codification of the government's
Brady/Giglio obligations, 117 the temporary defeat of Rule 16 reform at
the national level will likely lead to efforts by individual federal
district courts to modify their local criminal rules. Meanwhile,
advocates for enhanced Brady disclosures have begun to focus their
attention on attorney conduct rules and the professional responsibility
18
of prosecutors. 1
B. ABA Model Rule 3.8(d)
Most states have enacted attorney conduct rules fashioned
after ABA Model Rule 3.8(d),11 9 which requires prosecutors to disclose
exculpatory evidence to the defense. On its face, the "tends to negate
the guilt of the accused" language of Rule 3.8(d) 120 provides little
113. Id. at 5.
114. Id. at 9.
115. Id. at 6-7.
116. David Markus, When Liberty is at Risk, FairDisclosure Required, DAILY BUS. REV., May
2, 2011, www.dailybusinessreview.com/PubarticleDBR.jsp?id=1202492322147&hbxlogin=l#.
117. Mike Scarcella, Divided on Discovery, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 14, 2011.
118. Norman L. Reimer, Federal Discovery Reform: DOJ's Baby Steps are Inadequate, 34
CHAMPION 7, 8 (2010) ("Considering that the Ogden memoranda are unlikely to produce tangible
change, the defense bar should look beyond the narrow contours of Brady and pursue the ethics
route to obtain discovery.").
119. Niki Kuckes, The State of Rule 3.8. ProsecutorialEthics Reform Since Ethics 2000, 22
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 427 (2009). A chart showing states that have adopted the Model Rules
may be found at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/alpha-states.html.
120. Rule 3.8(d) provides that a prosecutor in a criminal case shall "make timely disclosure
to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the
guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the
defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor,
except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal."
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (1983).
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helpful guidance on the pressing issue of whether and how much
impeachment information must be turned over to a defendant prior to
a guilty plea. The Supreme Court has twice suggested that Rule 3.8
may impose disclosure obligations on prosecutors broader than due
process protections, although it has never precisely articulated how.121
In July 2009 the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility (hereinafter "Standing Committee") stepped into this
controversy and created a firestorm by issuing a bold and
controversial opinion that could have serious implications for the
timing and scope of impeachment disclosures.
In Formal Opinion 09-454, the Standing Committee stated
explicitly that Model Rule 3.8 was intended to extend discovery
obligations on prosecutors beyond constitutional requirements set
forth by Brady and its progeny. 122 The Standing Committee then went
on to discuss four important respects in which the ethical rule is
broader than constitutional norms.
First, the Standing Committee stated that, unlike Brady, Rule
3.8 contains no materiality element. 123 Exculpatory evidence must be
disclosed to the defendant whether or not it has a reasonable
probability of affecting the outcome of the case.
Nothing in the rule suggests a de minimis exception to the prosecutor's disclosure duty
where, for example, the prosecutor believes that the information has only a minimal
tendency to negate the defendant's guilt, or the favorable evidence is highly
1 24
unreliable.

The Standing Committee based this determination not on the text of
the rule itself, but rather on the history of the rule's enactment. This
argument from the rulemaking history is particularly unconvincing.
Imposing a special duty on prosecutors to disclose exculpatory
evidence dates as far back as the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics,
which in 1908 contained the following provision: "The suppression of
facts or the secreting of witnesses capable of establishingthe innocence

121. See Cone v. Bell, 129 S.Ct. 1769, 1783 n.15 (2009) ("Although the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted by Brady, only mandates the disclosure of material
evidence, the obligation to disclose evidence favorable to the defense may arise more broadly
under a prosecutor's ethical or statutory obligations.") (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437
(1995) ("[Tlhe rule in Bagley... requires less of the prosecution than the ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice, which call generally for prosecutorial disclosures of any evidence tending to
exculpate or mitigate.")).
122. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454 at 1 (2009)
[hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 09-454].
123. Id. at 4-5.
124. Id. at 5.

1454

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:5:1429

of the accused is highly reprehensible.' 2 5 The words "capable of
establishing" clearly denote some threshold of level of materiality,
such as likelihood of influencing the proceedings. With the adoption of
the Model Code in 1969, the ABA changed this language to the "tends
to negate guilt" standard (now also found in Model Rule 3.8(d)). 126
Although the Committee suggests that "experts" at the time of the
Model Code's enactment were of the opinion that DR 7-103 imposed
obligations beyond the due process standard, the Standing Committee
cites only one such "expert."1 27 Moreover, the Standing Committee
suggested that the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Agurs 128 somehow provides support for the proposition that Rule 3.8(d)
contains no materiality element.' 29 It is certainly true that Agursdecided seven years after the enactment of DR 7-103 and later
repudiated by Bagley-imposed a heavy burden on the defendant in
the absence of a specific request to show that the withheld evidence
created a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist. 13 0 While some
lower courts following Agurs and preceding Bagley imposed a
harmless error standard when dealing with withheld evidence that
was specifically requested by the defendant, 31 the comment to Model
Code 7-103(B) was modified following the Agurs decision to reiterate
that materiality remained an element of the prosecutor's ethical
duty. 32 Irrespective of how the materiality element morphed from
Brady through Agurs to Bagley, this history does nothing to
undermine the proposition that materiality was considered an
125. ABA CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS, Canon 5, available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/migratedcpr/mrpc/CanonsEthics.authcheckdam.pdf
(emphasis
added)
(noting that the Preamble and Canons 1 through 32 were first adopted August 27, 1908).
126. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103 (B).

127. See ABA Formal Op. 09-454, supra note 122, at 3 n.12 (citing Olavi Maru, ANN. CODE
OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY 330 (Am. B. Found. 1979) ("[A] disparity exists between the
prosecutor's disclosure duty as a matter of law and the prosecutor's duty as a matter of ethics.")).
128. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
129. ABA Formal Op. 09-454, supra note 122, at 4 n.12 (citing Agurs, 427 U.S. 97).
130. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107, 113. Nine years after Agurs, the Court in Bagley determined
that the defendant bears the burden of proving that undisclosed evidence was material,
irrespective of whether the undisclosed evidence was subject to a specific request, only a general
request, or not request at all. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). See also
discussion supra note 31 and accompanying text.
131. See Barbara Allen Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective
Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1153 (1982).
132. Distinguishing Agurs, the ABA in 1979 added a comment to DR 7-103(B) stating that
the ethical rule does not impose "a restrictive view" of materiality. ABA MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-103(B) cmt. (1980) (emphasis added). Imposing a less restrictive view of
materiality than set forth in the Agurs decision is something quite different than imposing no
materiality standard whatsoever.
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essential part of the due process obligation in 1963133 and was
retained in some fashion in DR 7-103, adopted six years later. I am
thus not nearly as confident as the Standing Committee that the
"background and history" of Rule 3.8(d) reveal an intent to dispense
with materiality considerations altogether, especially since the
drafters of DR 7-103 and Rule 3.8(d) used the phrase "tends to negate
guilt," which is very similar to language that appears in the Brady
opinion itself.
Second, the Standing Committee concluded that Rule 3.8(d)
requires "timely" disclosure to the accused, which the Committee
equated with "as soon as reasonably practical," and certainly in time
for the defense attorney to make reasonable use of the evidence or
information, including for use in plea negotiations.134 Reasoning that
"among the most significant purposes for which disclosure must be
made under Rule 3.8(d) is to enable defense counsel to advise the
135 the Committee
defendant regarding whether to plead guilty,"
concluded:
Because the defendant's decision may be strongly influenced by defense counsel's
evaluation of the strength of the prosecution's case, timely disclosure requires the
prosecutor to disclose evidence and information covered by Rule 3.8(d) prior to a1 guilty
36
plea proceeding, which may occur concurrently with the defendant's arraignment.

This section of the opinion suggests that a prosecutor who withholds
impeachment evidence prior to a guilty plea may be subject to
professional discipline, even though she clearly is not violating
constitutional safeguards after Ruiz.
Third, the Standing Committee concluded that Rule 3.8(d)
requires the disclosure of evidence "or information" that tends to
negate guilt while the Brady decision only arguably requires
disclosure of exculpatory "evidence." 137 In Formal Opinion 09-454 the
Standing Committee determined that
[the] ethical duty of disclosure is not limited to admissible "evidence," such as physical
and documentary evidence, and transcripts of favorable testimony; it also requires
disclosure of favorable "information." Though possibly inadmissible itself, favorable

133. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("We now hold that the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment .... ") (emphasis added).
134. ABA Formal Op. 09-454, supra note 122, at 6.
135. Id.
136. Id. (footnotes omitted).
137. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. See discussion supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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information may lead a defendant's lawyer to admissible
testimony or other evidence or
138
assist him in other ways, such as in plea negotiations.

As discussed above, this construction of Rule 3.8(d) exceeds the
duty imposed on prosecutors under Brady, which has been interpreted
by some lower courts to apply only to admissible evidence.
Fourth, and perhaps most significantly for the purposes of our
present discussion, the Standing Committee discussed Ruiz and
opined that Rule 3.8(d), unlike constitutional guarantees, is not
waivable by the defendant as part of a plea agreement. 139 "A
defendant's consent does not absolve a prosecutor of the duty imposed
by Rule 3.8(d) and, therefore, a prosecutor may not solicit, accept, or
rely on the defendant's consent."'140 The Standing Committee reasoned
that Rule 3.8 (unlike other attorney conduct rules such as prohibitions
on conflicts of interest' 4 1 or disclosure of client confidences 142) does not
143
specifically mention the consent of the defendant or his counsel.
Absent an express exception, a "third party may not typically absolve
a lawyer of their [sic] duty to comply with ethical obligations."'144 The
Standing Committee concluded that one of the primary purposes of
Rule 3.8's disclosure requirement is to promote the public's interest in
the reliability and accuracy of criminal proceedings; quality
representation at the plea bargaining stage would be undermined by
the allowance of a waiver of Rule 3.8(d) because defense counsel would
not have access to the information they need to advise and represent
145
their clients effectively.
The Standing Committee's very cursory two-paragraph
discussion of waiver in Formal Opinion 09-454 suffers from two
principal flaws. First, Rule 3.8(d) pertains to the disclosure of
evidence. The Standing Committee's conclusion (unsupported by any
citation or authority) that a prosecutor may not "solicit or accept" a
waiver of access to exculpatory evidence is clearly wrong: nothing in
the text of the rule prohibits a prosecutor from including waiver
language in a plea agreement, presuming there is no subsequent

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

ABA Formal Opinion 09-454, supra note 122, at 5.
Id. at 7.
Id.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (1983).
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (1983).
ABA Formal Op. 09-454, supra note 122, at 7.
Id.
Id.
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withholding of evidence in reliance on that waiver.1 46 More
fundamentally, the text of the rule explicitly allows for nondisclosure
of evidence upon approval of a tribunal. 147 Where a court accepts a
plea agreement containing a waiver provision during a Rule 11
colloquy 148 and advises the defendant about the rights he is foregoing
under the agreement (including, if applicable, the right to further
discovery), this functionally relieves the prosecutor of her obligations
under the rule.
In one critical respect, the Standing Committee interpreted
Model Rule 3.8(d) to be narrower than the constitutional disclosure
rule. As discussed above, the Due Process Clause requires disclosure
of exculpatory evidence in the possession of anyone "acting on the
government's behalf in the case,"1 49 including police and other
investigative agents. The text of Rule 3.8(d) requires disclosure of
evidence "known to the prosecutor."1 50 The Standing Committee
interpreted this phrase to require "actual knowledge," although they
recognized that knowledge "may be inferred from the circumstances"
and that a prosecutor "cannot ignore the obvious." 15 1 This latter
language slightly objectifies what otherwise appears to be an explicitly
subjective standard. For example, a prosecutor might be generally
aware that certain impeachment evidence about an informant exists
in the hands of police or agents without knowing its precise scope or
contours. A prosecutor might also have general knowledge of the
existence of impeachment evidence about a victim from the victim's
involvement in prior cases or discussions with other prosecutors, but
this information might not have been documented and might have
faded from the prosecutor's memory. Both of these forms of knowledge
would apparently suffice to trigger disclosure obligations (or at least
further inquiry) under Rule 3.8(d) as interpreted by the Standing
Committee.152

146. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(c) (1983) ("Prosecutor in a criminal case
shall . . . not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial
rights.").
147. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (1983).

148. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(2) (requiring parties to disclose any existing plea agreement
when defendant offers a change of plea); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)-(5) (circumstances under
which court may accept or reject agreement).
149. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995).
150. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (1983).
151. ABA Formal Op. 09-454, supra note 122, at 7 (citing Model Rule 1.0(f) and Model Rule
1.13 cmt. 3).
152. See id. at 6 ("If the prosecutor has not yet reviewed voluminous files or obtained all
police files, however, Rule 3.8 does not require the prosecutor to review or request such files
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The Standing Committee was clearly anxious to distinguish the
requirements of Model Rule 3.8(d) from the Supreme Court's Brady
jurisprudence with regard to timing and materiality. In doing so,
however, it waded into a hornets' nest with perhaps unintended
consequences by failing to explicitly distinguish impeachment
evidence from other forms of exculpatory evidence and by foreclosing
the possibility of waiver. The reasoning of Formal Opinion 09-454 is
thus misguided and flawed in several important respects. The opinion
suggests that prosecutors may be subjected to bar discipline if they
fail to disclose to the defense any favorable evidence in their
possession before a guilty plea, no matter how de minimis or
inconsequential it may be and no matter what waivers are agreed to
by the defendant as part of the plea arrangement. Needless to say, it
has sent a chill down the spine of the prosecutorial community.
Perhaps to garner enough votes to reach its preferred
conclusions, the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility sidestepped any explicit conclusion about impeachment
information. It did so in a very strategic fashion, by crafting a
hypothetical to frame its opinion that dealt only with evidence that
was "classically" exculpatory in the sense that it directly supported
the innocence of the accused. 153 But there is no reason to believe that
the same conclusions it reached regarding the materiality and timing
of disclosures of exculpatory evidence would not also apply to
impeachment information. First, impeachment evidence is a subset of
evidence "favorable to the accused," as the Supreme Court has
consistently recognized. 154 The Standing Committee admitted as much
in footnote 6, when it cited two impeachment cases for the proposition
that state disciplinary authorities sometimes discipline prosecutors for
Brady violations. 155 Even more ominously, in discussing the
nonwaivability of Rule 3.8(d) and addressing the Ruiz decision's
unless the prosecutor actually knows or infers from the circumstances, or it is obvious, that
the files contain favorable evidence or information.") (emphasis added).
153. The hypothetical the Committee used to frame its opinion involved two bystander
witnesses to an armed robbery who viewed a line-up in which the accused was a participant and
told police officers that "they did not see the perpetrator," and a confidential informant's tip to
law enforcement that someone other than the accused committed the offense. Both are examples
of evidence or information supporting factual innocence. Id. at 1.
154. See supra notes 23-24.
155. ABA Formal Op. 09-454, supra note 122, at 3 n.6 (citing Office of Disciplinary Counsel
v. Wrenn, 790 N.E.2d 1195, 1198 (Ohio 2003) (prosecutor failed to disclose at pretrial hearing
results of DNA tests in child sexual abuse case that were favorable to defendant and fact that
that victim had changed his story); In re Grant, 541 S.E.2d 540, 540 (S.C. 2001) (prosecutor
failed to fully disclose exculpatory material and impeachment evidence regarding statements
given by state's key witness in murder prosecution)).
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characterization of impeachment information as less critical to the
accused at the plea bargaining stage of a criminal proceeding than at
trial, the Committee stated that "[i]n any event, even if courts were to
hold that the right to favorable evidence may be entirely waived for
constitutional purposes, the ethical obligations established by Rule
3.8(d) are not coextensive with the prosecutor's constitutional duties of
disclosure ... ,"156 These two sections of the Formal Opinion strongly
suggest an intention to apply its conclusions to impeachment
information, even if the Committee lacked the political will to say so
directly.
It is too early to tell whether and to what extent state bar
authorities will interpret their own disciplinary rules consistently
with ABA Opinion 09-454. So far, two states (California and Ohio)
have shown explicit hostility to its reasoning. 157 Yet defense counsel
effort to obtain
are already using the opinion very aggressively in an
158
court.
federal
in
particularly
more preplea discovery,

156. ABA Formal Op. 09-454, supra note 122, at 7 n.33.
157. In September 2010 the California State Bar Board of Governors approved sixty-seven
new professional conduct rules for consideration by the California Supreme Court, as part of an
ongoing effort to modernize that state's attorney conduct rules and bring them more in line with
the ABA Model Rules. One of the main points of controversy during its September meeting was
"how broadly or narrowly to frame the prosecutor's ethical obligation to disclose exculpatory
evidence." Joan C. Rogers, In Its Final Look at Full Set of Updates, CaliforniaBar Endorses Last
Seven Rules, 26 LAWYERS' MAN. PROF'L CONDUCT 619, 620 (2010). In light of California
prosecutors' fierce opposition to the language and reasoning of ABA Ethics Opinion 09-454, the
Committee decided to forego the highly general "timely disclosure of evidence or information that
tends to negate guilt" language of ABA Model Rule 3.8(d) and replace it with the more specific
and narrower requirement that prosecutors comply with "all constitutional obligations, as
interpreted by relevant case law." Id. at 621. In February 2010, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected
arguments that state disciplinary rule 7-103 imposes an ethical obligation on prosecutors to
disclose impeachment information before a guilty plea, without explicitly referencing ABA
Formal Opinion 09-454. See Disciplinary Counsel v. Kellogg-Martin, 923 N.E.2d 125, 130 (Ohio
2010) (findingdisciplinary obligation no more extensive than legal obligation). Prior to the
release of ABA Formal Opinion 09-454, two jurisdictions had already interpreted their
disciplinary rules to contain a materiality element, contrary to the ABA Ethics Committee's
analysis. See In re Attorney C, 47 P.3d 1167, 1167, 1173 (Colo. 2002) (en banc) (requiring both
materiality and intentional failure to disclose for violation of Colo. Rules Profl Conduct 3.8(d),
and defining the requisite intent as "conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular
result"); see also D.C. RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 ("[Rule 3.8] is not intended either to
restrict or to expand the obligations of prosecutors derived from the United States Constitution,
federal or District of Columbia statutes, and court rules of procedure.").
158. Irwin H. Schwartz, Beyond Brady: Using Model Rule 3.8(d) in Federal Court for
Discovery of Exculpatory Information, 34 CHAMPION 34, 35 (2010); see, e.g., United States v.
Colacurcio, No. CR-09-209TAJ, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 9, 2010); United States v. Kott, No. 0700056 (D. Alaska Oct. 23, 2009).
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IV. WHO SHOULD REGULATE THE CONDUCT OF PROSECUTORS WITH
REGARD TO PREPLEA IMPEACHMENT DISCLOSURES, AND How?

In the coming months it is likely that many federal district
courts will be debating amendments to their local criminal rules, and
state supreme courts will be debating whether to adopt the ABA's
broad construction of Model Rule 3.8(d). In both arenas, a focal point
of controversy is likely to be the preplea disclosure of impeachment
evidence. The crux of that debate is twofold: (1) Are attorney conduct
rules or rules of criminal procedure the better vehicle to regulate a
prosecutor's preplea discovery obligations?; and (2) How much
impeachment evidence should a prosecutor be required to disclose
before a guilty plea? In this Part, I will turn my attention to these two
questions. The first, I submit, is a question of institutional competence
and the second is a question of fundamental fairness.
A. Institutional Competence
Attorney conduct rules are a very poor vehicle to convey and
enforce prosecutors' preplea disclosure obligations. Prosecutors are
seldom disciplined for failing to turn over material exculpatory
evidence prior to trial, even where the misconduct has been identified
by an appellate court upon reversal of a criminal conviction 59 and
even where the misconduct is intentional. 160 Many commentators have
identified and criticized the reluctance of bar disciplinary authorities
to enforce Rule 3.8(d), speculating that their reticence results from
lack of expertise, 161 reluctance to interfere with the executive branch,

159. See Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutorsfor Brady Violations,
A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 731 (1987); Fred C. Zacharias, The ProfessionalDisciplineof
Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 744-45 (2001) (a survey of 100 bar discipline complaints
against prosecutors found very few sanctions for failure to disclose exculpatory evidence; and
when discipline was imposed this misconduct was usually coupled with other infractions such as
presenting false evidence or lying to the court); see also Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias,
Regulating Federal Prosecutors Ethics, 55 VAND. L. REV. 381, 398 (2002) ("[D]isciplinary
authorities do not appear particularly eager to bring actions against prosecutors except in
situations involving unambiguously wrongful conduct.").
160. Medwed, supra note 35, at 1546-47 (2010) (citing "glaring example of disciplinary
inaction" in California with regard to Tulare County prosecutor).
161. According to the California Bar Journal, there were 4,741 public disciplinary actions
taken against that state's attorneys in the twelve years between 1997 and 2009, and only six of
those cases involved conduct by prosecutors in handling criminal cases. See Kathleen M. Ridolfi
& Maurice Possley, PREVENTABLE ERROR: A REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN

CALIFORNIA 1997-2009, at 54 (Oct. 2010), available at http:/llaw.scu.edulncip/file/
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a belief that courts are better situated to enforce discovery through
the rules of criminal procedure, and the political power of law
enforcement. 162 If bar disciplinary authorities are hesitant to
investigate and prosecute instances of discovery abuse in the trial
context, then they will be even more hesitant to do so in the guilty
plea context, where the defendant has admitted his guilt and where a
lengthy and expensive adversarial process has not been subverted by a
prosecutor's missteps. Moreover,
recent studies show that
prosecutors-and particularly state prosecutors-seem
to be
unaffected by the rules of professional conduct. 163 Adding a toothless
standard to Rule 3.8(d)-or worse yet, a toothless interpretation of an
already highly generalized ethical norm 164 -- is unlikely to have any
165 If
impact on a prosecutor's discovery practices prior to a guilty plea.
such a professional conduct rule has any signaling function at all, then
it may signal that ethical norms are out of touch with the realities of
166
criminal practice.
I do not claim that state bar disciplinary authorities lack the
authority to regulate preplea impeachment disclosures. Ethical rules
may and sometimes do impose obligations on attorneys above and
167
beyond the Constitution or rules of civil and criminal procedure.

ProsecutorialMisconductBookEntireonline%20version.pdf. This statistic suggests that the staff
of bar disciplinary agencies may not have sufficient experience with criminal matters to handle
complex issues involving the materiality of impeachment information.
162. See Peter Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful
Convictions, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 399, 427; Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It is Time to
Take ProsecutionDiscipline Seriously, 8 UDC[DCSL L. REV. 275, 292-93 (2004).
163. Ellen Yaroshefsky & Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors' Ethics in Context: Influences on
ProsecutorialDisclosure (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 6) (on file with author); see Blasser et
al., supra note 38, at 1996 ("Rules have limited influence, particularly where the compliance
infrastructure related to the rule is weak."); Janet C. Hoeffel, ProsecutorialDiscretion at the
Core: The Good ProsecutorMeets Brady, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1133, 1146 (2005) (suggesting
that "the prudent prosecutor is unconcerned about an ethical violation.... [H]e has never heard
of a prosecutor being disciplined for his exercise of discretion in withholding evidence.").
164. See ABA Formal Op. 09-454, supra note 122, and related discussion.
165. See Stephanos Bibas, ProsecutorialRegulation versus ProsecutorialAccountability, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 959, 977-83 (2009) (arguing that tougher disciplinary rules generally are not
going to be effective at changing prosecutorial behavior because they will not necessarily lead to
increased enforcement, and advocating for solutions based on corporate stakeholder strategies to
increase accountability of each office).
166. See W. Bradley Wendel, Non-Legal Regulation of the Legal Profession:Social Norms in
Professional Communities, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1955, 1957 (2001) ("A fairly stable consensus now
seems to exist in the legal ethics literature that rules of 'ethics' stated in the form of enforceable
penal codes, have limited utility to remedy many of the observed problems with the professional
conduct of lawyers.").
167. See United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1988) (declining to interpret
DR 7-104 as coextensive with the Sixth Amendment because the Model Code of Professional
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Rule 3.8(d) could be amended (or interpreted in its commentary) to
require prosecutors to disclose impeaching information prior to a
guilty plea, and these state rules could certainly be applied to state
prosecutors. Whether such regulations could be applied to federal
prosecutors is a much closer question. Although federal prosecutors
are bound by the state ethical rules in the jurisdictions in which they
practice, 168 there is a convincing argument that the Citizens
Protection Act (commonly known as the McDade Amendment) would
prevent state bar disciplinary authorities from applying such a broad
construction of Rule 3.8(d) to federal prosecutors operating within
their jurisdictions. This is because, as discussed below, it would
conflict not only with Ruiz but also with the Jencks Act and several
169
local district court rules.
My point is that a broad construction of Rule 3.8(d) that
requires preplea impeachment disclosures would be ineffectual and
inappropriate. It would be ineffectual because a prosecutor is unlikely
to heed such an interpretation with regard to impeachment material
in the face of a directly contrary ruling by the Supreme Court under
the Due Process Clause, and a disciplinary board is unlikely to bring
any enforcement actions where the defendant has waived trial and
pleaded guilty. It would be inappropriate because such a detailed and
specific rule regarding the contours and timing of impeachment
disclosures is really a rule of discovery masquerading as a rule of
professional responsibility. Rather than conduct having a negative
Responsibility is "designed to safeguard the integrity of the profession" and therefore "secures
protections not contemplated by the Constitution").
168. 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2006).
169. See Stern v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Mass., 214 F.3d 4, 20 (1st Cir. 2000) (in
addressing whether local federal rule adopting 3.8(f) and constraining subpoenas to defense
attorneys violated rulemaking power of district court, the court concluded that the McDade
Amendment did not render issue moot: the regulations pursuant to 530B "dispel the notion that
§ 530B grants states or local federal district courts the power, in the guise of regulating ethics, to
impose strictures [on federal prosecutors] that are inconsistent with federal law"); United States
v. Syling, 553 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1192-93 (D. Haw. 2008) (holding that state ethics rule could not
be applied to impose a duty on federal prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence to grand jury).
The second paragraph of the McDade Amendment provides that "the Attorney General shall
make and amend rules of the Department of Justice to assure compliance with this section." 28
U.S.C. § 530B(b). The Attorney General has implemented a regulation under the Act providing
that "[§] 530B requires Department attorneys to comply with state and local federal court rules
of professional responsibility, but should not be construed in any way to alter federal substantive,
procedural, or evidentiary law or to interfere with the Attorney General's authority to send
Department attorneys into any court in the United States." 28 C.F.R. § 77. l(b) (emphasis added);
see Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1975) (explaining that
state laws can be preempted by federal regulations as well as by federal statutes); Green &
Zacharias, supra note 159, at 414 (arguing that 530B(b) is a grant by Congress to the DOJ of
power to preempt state ethical rules).

20111

PLEA BARGAINING AND DISCOVERY

1463

impact on a particular cause of action, attorney conduct rules typically
focus on conduct exhibiting an affront to the court, conduct exhibiting
unfitness to practice law generally, or conduct "recognized by
' 170
consensus within the bar as inappropriate."
Even if one considers the disclosure of impeachment
information to implicate the "ethics" of a prosecutor, attorney conduct
rules are not the sole or even the dominant source of norms with
regard to litigation ethics. 171 Rules of procedure, rules of evidence, and
the court's inherent supervisory authority are also sources of ethical
guidance for litigators, and these standards complement and
sometimes supplement each other.1 72 Other scholars have noted the
limitations of ethical rules in the context of civil litigation and have
recommended greater attention to procedural and evidentiary rules as
a way to monitor controversial attorney behavior.1 73 Moreover, ethical
rules and rules of criminal procedure derive from different
perspectives; the former are driven largely by recommendations from
the bar with very little public input, while the latter are driven
primarily by the judiciary, subject to public comment and, in many
jurisdictions, legislative approval. 174 If, as the ABA Standing
Committee opined in Formal Opinion 09-454, the preplea disclosure of
exculpatory information serves primarily to promote "the public's
interest in the fairness and reliability of the criminal justice
170. See United States v. Colo. Supreme Court, 189 F.3d 1281, 1287 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing
factors court should look to in deciding whether rule is one of ethics or procedure for purposes of
McDade Amendment).
171. See Judith A. McMorrow, The (F)Utility of Rules: Regulating Attorney Conduct in
Federal Court, 58 SMU L. REV. 3, 22 (2005) (explaining collapse of effort to create uniform rules
of attorney conduct in federal court).
172. Id. at 10.
173. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlement of Mass Torts: When the Rules
Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1217-19 (1995) (arguing that ethical rules alone will
not promote just settlements in class actions, and that courts need to undertake more
substantive review of settlement processes and outcomes under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)). A
distinguished panel on the subject of spoliation of e-discovery at Duke Law School recently
concluded that the rules of civil procedure are the appropriate vehicle to address the
preservation of electronic records and consequences for failing to do so. Thomas Y. Allman,
Preservation Rulemaking after the 2010 Litigation Conference, 11 SEDONA CONF. J. 217, 225
(2010); see Dan H. Willoughby, Jr., Rose Hunter Jones & Gregory R. Antine, Sanctions for EDiscovery Violations: By the Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789 (2010).
174. See Benjamin H. Barton, Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should
Control Lawyer Regulation-Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV 1167, 1205-08
(2003) (concluding that when enacting professional conduct rules, state supreme courts may be
too susceptible to the lawyer lobby and too inaccessible to the public); see also LAFAVE, ISRAEL,
KING & KERR, 1 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.7(f) (some state constitutions give authority over
criminal rulemaking directly to the judiciary, while other states follow the model of the Rules
Enabling Act and consider it a delegation of authority from legislative branch).

1464

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:5:1429

system," 175 then regulating such disclosures should be undertaken by
the stakeholder with the greatest expertise in the matter and in a
fashion that permits the most public involvement.
Rules of criminal procedure are a far more promising vehicle
for regulation of prosecutors with regard to preplea impeachment
disclosures for at least three reasons. First, the courts are accustomed
to regulating discovery in criminal cases and resolving competing
tensions with regard to fairness, efficiency, and witness privacy.
Second, the rules of criminal procedure tend to be enacted at a more
granular level of specificity than attorney conduct rules, which are
typically written in highly generalized terms.1 76 Third, the courts have
a broader array of case-based sanctions available to them for discovery
violations, such as exclusion of evidence, contempt, fines, attorney fee
awards, adverse jury instructions, and, if extreme prejudice could be
shown, possibly dismissal of an indictment.1 77 This arsenal of casebased sanctions is far more likely to be effective in motivating
prosecutors to be fastidious about their discovery obligations than the
unlikely threat of a private or public reprimand from a bar
disciplinary board long after a criminal case has concluded. They are
also more closely aimed at remedying the harm to the defendant
caused by the prosecutor's conduct.
Even where attorney conduct rules overlap with rules of
criminal procedure in spheres of mutual influence, bar disciplinary
authorities tend to defer to a trial court's prerogative to enforce
discovery obligations in the context of live pending cases. The decision
of the Colorado Supreme Court in In the Matter of Attorney C178 is
instructive on the relative institutional competence of trial courts and
bar disciplinary authorities. The respondent was an assistant district
175. ABA Formal Op. 09-454, supranote 122, at 7.
176. See Christina Parajon, Discovery Audits: Model Rule 3.8(d) and the Prosecutor'sDuty to
Disclose, 119 YALE L.J. 1339, 1143-44 (2010) ("[V]agueness inhibits the implementation of the
Model Rule, a process that is demonstrably incomplete. Research indicates that local disciplinary
authorities are generally reluctant to find and sanction 3.8(d) violations .... "); Prosser, supra
note 34, at 603-608 (arguing that specific articulation of disclosure obligations through new and
more detailed rules of criminal procedure would make nondisclosure based on ignorance less
likely and would provide greater guidance to prosecutors).
177. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2)(D) (authorizing court to enter any sanction for
noncompliance "that is just under the circumstances"); see also United States v. Shaygan, 661 F.
Supp. 2d 1289, 1292-93 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (awarding attorney fees to defense counsel under Hyde
Amendment following acquittal for discovery violations); United States v. W.R. Grace, CR 05-07M-DWM (D. Mont. 2009) (adverse jury instruction). See generally United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d
754, 766-67 (1st Cir. 1994) (discussing inherent supervisory powers of the federal courts); United
States v. Jones, 620 F.Supp.2d 163, 178-80 (D. Mass. 2009) (same).
178. In re Attorney C, 47 P.3d 1167 (Colo. 2002).
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attorney charged with misconduct for failure to disclose exculpatory
evidence before preliminary hearings in two different criminal
matters. The hearing board found that the respondent violated
Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8(d) in both casesnegligently in the first and knowingly in the second-and
recommended a public reprimand. 179 The Colorado Supreme Court
reversed, ruling for the first time that their state version of Rule 3.8(d)
incorporated both a materiality element and a mens rea of intent.
Construing the "timely" component of the rule to require disclosure
before the next critical stage of the criminal proceeding, the court held
that the "rule was unclear" before its application to the respondent
and therefore respondent could not have had an intent to withhold
evidence in contravention of the ethical mandate.1 8 0 In ruling for the
respondent, the court took a very dim view of the efficacy of
professional discipline in the area of criminal discovery:
[Dliscovery issues arise in almost every criminal case. Trial courts routinely make
findings of fact and enter orders and sanctions designed to respond to the severity of the
violation . . . . Not only is management, regulation, and supervision of discovery
preeminently a trial court function ... but we also have case law and rules of procedure
We neither wish to upset that
specifically tailored to redress any discovery violations.
18 1
process nor to interject regulatory counsel into it.

While perhaps extraordinary in terms of its candor, the In re
Attorney C case reflects the view that the attorney grievance system is
18 2
"ill-suited to addresso any but the most serious discovery violations"
in criminal cases. The North Carolina version of ABA Model Rule
3.8(d) explicitly recognizes the superior competence of courts in this
area by requiring prosecutors to "make timely disclosure to the
defense of all evidence or information required to be disclosed by
applicable law, rules of procedure, or court opinions including all
evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate
'18 3
the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense.
B. FundamentalFairness
Should the rules of criminal procedure attempt to undo in any
fashion the effect of Ruiz? Today's dominant justification for plea
bargaining is the so-called "trial shadow" theory-plea bargaining is

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 1173.
Id. at 1174.
Id. at 1173-74.
Id. at 1174.
N.C. State Bar Rules, ch. 2, Rule 3.8(d) (emphasis added).
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the product of both parties' rational forecast of the likely sentence
after trial, discounted by the risk of conviction/acquittal and the costs
to the party of going forward.1 8 4 Within the trial shadow framework,
arguments in favor of broader preplea disclosure essentially proceed
18
on two levels: voluntariness and accuracy. 5
According to the voluntariness argument,18 6 enhanced
impeachment disclosures will help make sure the guilty plea process
more closely mirrors trial outcomes by promoting the defendant's
informed assessment of the strength of the government's case and the
likelihood of conviction following trial. The problem with the
voluntariness argument is that it proves too much. The absence of
impeachment evidence is just one form of information deficit that a
defendant faces when he pleads guilty. A defendant may not know
whether the government's evidence will be suppressed, whether key
witnesses will show up for trial, whether the victim will be able to
make an in-court identification, whether the judge will consider the
evidence at trial sufficient to warrant a particular jury instruction
favorable to the defense (e.g., self-defense, entrapment), whether the
government will survive a directed verdict and make it tactically
necessary for the defendant to take the stand, and so forth.18 7 What
separates discovery questions from other forms of trial uncertainty is
that in the former situation the information is known to the
government but not to the defendant, whereas in the latter situation
184. Russell D. Covey, Signalingand Plea Bargaining'sInnocence Problem, 66 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 73, 77 (2009); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101
YALE L.J. 1909, 1948 (1992).
185. Yaroshefsky, supra note 15, at 31-32 (arguing for enhanced disclosures prior to guilty
plea to promote voluntariness and accuracy).
186. See Daniel P. Blank, PleaBargain Waivers Reconsidered.-A Legal Pragmatist'sGuide to
Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2011, 2040-42 (2000) (arguing that
Brady disclosure insures the voluntariness of guilty pleas, promotes factual accuracy, and
encourages meaningful consent); Erica Hashimoto, Toward Ethical Plea Bargaining, 30
CARDOZO L. REV. 949, 952 (2008) ("Lack of information about impeachment or exculpatory
evidence exacerbates the inequity of the plea process because without access to this information,
defendants have no leverage to obtain pleas that accurately reflect the strength of the
government's case against them.").
187. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970) (upholding a guilty plea against
later attack on grounds that it was not voluntary: "We find no requirement in the Constitution..
. that a defendant must be permitted to disown his solemn admissions in open court that he
committed the act with which he is charged simply because it later develops that the state would
have had a weaker case than the defendant had thought."); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759, 771 (1970) (plea of guilty based on reasonably competent advice of counsel not open to later
attack on the ground that counsel have misjudged admissibility of confession: "All the pertinent
facts normally cannot be known unless witnesses are examined and cross-examined in court ....
In the face of unavoidable uncertainty, the defendant and his counsel must make their best
judgment as to the weight of the State's case.").
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both parties labor under the same uncertainty. But if by "voluntary
and intelligent"1 88 we mean autonomous as opposed to fully informed,
the government's state of mind (knowing information and failing to
disclose it) cannot convert an otherwise volitional act on the part of
the defendant into an involuntary one. Both parties possess
information at the time of a guilty plea unshared with the other. The
prosecutor may have more experience trying cases before the trial
judge than the defense attorney and have greater insights into her
likely rulings; the prosecutor might have tried several other cases
with a particular police officer as a witness and know that she will not
fare particularly well on cross-examination; and the prosecutor may
know that the victim is terminally ill and unlikely to live until the
time of trial. No plausible construction of due process or Model Rule
3.8(d) would suggest that any of that information needs to be shared
with a defendant before his sworn admission of guilt before a judge
will be considered "voluntary." The critical value of impeachment
information lies in its function to help prepare a trial attorney to
cross-examine adverse witnesses. 189 Since by pleading guilty the
defendant is specifically waiving the right to confront the witnesses
against him, 190 it is particularly difficult to argue that this form of
information deficit (i.e., what ammunition he might use on crossexamination and to what effect) is any more troubling than many
other uncertainties faced by a defendant.
Other scholars have argued that enhanced discovery before a
plea bargain will help promote the "accuracy" of guilty pleas. 191 For
example, Professor McMunigal's accuracy argument proceeds as
follows. Innocent defendants sometimes may not know whether they
are guilty due to cognitive impediments present at the time of the
event, but they nevertheless may plead guilty to avoid harsh
sentencing consequences following trial. For example, youth, mental
infirmity, or intoxication may all render a suspect incapable of
assessing accurately the factual circumstances leading up to the

188. Under Supreme Court precedent a guilty plea is voluntary and intelligent if the
defendant (1) is aware of the essential nature of the charges against him, (2) is advised by
competent counsel, and (3) is not induced to plea by threats, inducements, or improper promises.
Brady, 397 U.S. at 755.
189. See Laura Berend, Less Reliable PreliminaryHearings and Plea Bargains in Criminal
Cases in California: Discovery Before and After Proposition 115, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 465, 472
(1998).
190. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
191. McMunigal, supra note 14, at 968; McMunigal, supra note 56, at 660; Prosser, supra
note 34, at 549, 560.
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alleged offense. 192 Disclosure of impeachment information prior to a
guilty plea to defendants who actually do not know whether they are
guilty will help such defendants better understand their chances of
acquittal following trial and reduce the incidence of inaccurate
outcomes.
The accuracy problem should certainly cause us more pause
than the voluntariness concern. There may be rare situations 193 where
an accused does not remember the incident with sufficient clarity to
make an honest assessment of his legal responsibility. 194 But the
critical question is whether those situations are common enough to
warrant a major resource commitment to enhanced preplea
discovery.1 95 A solemn admission in open court by the defendant
during allocution that he committed the offense is entitled to great
deference; 96 this presumption of regularity should not be disturbed
merely because we can imagine a situation where the defendant is
unsure whether he committed the offense but is willing to say that he
did in order to gain the benefits of a favorable plea bargain. Moreover,
the same defendants under Professor McMunigal's scenario who are
handicapped in assessing their own conduct are also handicapped in
assessing the strength of the inculpatory evidence against them (e.g.,

192. McMunigal, supra note 14, at 968; McMunigal, supranote 56, at 657-58.
193. Professor McMunigal concedes that it is "undoubtedly true in most cases" that a
criminal defendant knows whether he or she committed the offense charged. McMunigal, supra
note 56, at 657.
194. Professor McMunigal envisions a situation where a defendant charged with motor
vehicle homicide who blacked out and lost control of her car in a rainstorm might not be in a
position to have observed the circumstances leading up the accident, and therefore might not be
in a good position to challenge the conclusions of an accident reconstruction expert that she was
grossly exceeding the speed limit. Id. at 659. In the hypothetical raised by Professor McMunigal,
that state expert is subject to impeachment on a number of grounds not disclosed prior to the
guilty plea. See id.
195. See United States. v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) ("Our procedure has been
always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream."). Although
criticism certainly may be leveled at Judge Hand's cynical observation in Garsson, especially in
light of modern technology's ability to help exonerate those wrongfully convicted by a jury after
trial, our moral concern about the incidence of false conviction is justifiably less where the
defendant admits his guilt before a judge under oath.
196. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) ("[D]efendants advised by
competent counsel and protected by other procedural safeguards are... unlikely to be driven to
false self-condemnation."); Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975) (per curiam) ("[A]
counseled plea of guilty is an admission of factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and
intelligent, it quite validly removes the issue of factual guilt from the case."); see also United
States. v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 676-77 (1997) ("Given the great care with which pleas are taken
under [the] revised Rule 11, there is no reason to view pleas so taken as merely 'tentative,'
subject to withdrawal before sentence whenever the government cannot establish prejudice."
(quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 advisory committee's note) (alteration in original)).
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the physical presence of purported eyewitnesses, their proximity to
the event in question, the circumstances under which forensic or other
evidence was gathered from the defendant at the scene, etc.). As the
court implied in Ruiz, unless we are prepared to say that full
disclosure of inculpatory evidence is a precondition to a knowing and
intelligent guilty plea, any rule that requires disclosure of
impeachment evidence would benefit defendants with more
independent knowledge about the incident in question over the
cognitively handicapped defendants that Professor McMunigal seeks
197
to protect.
The accuracy argument is also flawed because it proceeds as if
the prosecutor were the only relevant actor in plea negotiations. If a
defense attorney confronts a client who suffers cognitive impediments
that could limit the client's ability to comprehend whether or not he
committed the alleged offense, that attorney has a duty to investigate
the case more thoroughly than otherwise before counseling a guilty
plea. 198 Certainly impeachment material is more accessible to the
government than to the defense, especially in federal court where the
prosecutor is not required to provide the accused with a list of
witnesses. But in cases where the client is mentally, emotionally, or
cognitively impaired, defense attorneys may counsel their clients to
refuse to sign plea agreements containing waivers of access to
impeachment information and wait until fuller discovery is provided
closer to trial before entertaining a change of plea. Moreover, plea
negotiations do not take place in a vacuum; they take place during
oral and written communications between the prosecutor and defense
counsel. If during plea bargaining the defense counsel specifically asks
the prosecutor about the presence or absence of impeachment
evidence, then rules pertaining to candor already prohibit the
prosecutor from engaging in misrepresentation.' 99
In addition to these conceptual problems with the accuracy
argument, there are serious pragmatic obstacles to mandating
enhanced disclosure of impeachment information at the guilty plea
197. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 630-31 (2002) (recognizing that the extent to which
preplea impeachment disclosure helps a defendant depends on the defendant's independent
knowledge of the prosecution's case).
198. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (holding that guarantee of
effective assistance of counsel under Sixth Amendment encompasses defense attorney's
obligation to conduct reasonable investigation of facts); see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct.
1473, 1484 (2010) (explaining that, when considering motions for post-conviction relief after
guilty plea on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, there is no relevant distinction
between acts of omission or commission of defense counsel for purposes of Strickland analysis).
199. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(d), R. 4.1 (1983).
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stage of criminal proceedings. In my view, these implementation
problems collectively outweigh the accuracy concerns voiced by
McMunigal, Prosser, and others. Some but not all of these obstacles
were identified by the Supreme Court in Ruiz, where the Court quite
appropriately recognized that due process analysis allows courts to
weigh the nature of the private interest at stake against any adverse
impact or costs imposed upon the government and the public interest
200
by increased disclosure.
First, requiring the disclosure of impeachment information
before a guilty plea poses a serious timing problem. Evidence is only
impeaching if it can be used to undercut the credibility of a
government witness or exhibit. Especially for plea bargaining
discussions that occur soon after arraignment, before any concerted
trial preparation has begun, the government may not know whom it
will call as a witness at trial and what exhibits it will introduce.
20 1
Professor Douglass properly refers to that as a "matching" problem.
The matching problem is highlighted in Scenario 2 in Part II above. If
there are a number of eyewitnesses to an armed robbery and not all of
them will testify, evidence of intoxication that is impeaching as to one
observer but not others would not be subject to disclosure under Brady
and not admissible at trial unless that particular bystander is called
by the government as a witness. Similarly, in Scenario 3, the
government may attempt to prove the bank fraud without calling the
lead case agent who packaged the referral for prosecution. This may
be possible if other investigators worked on the case or if important
documentary evidence is admissible as a business or public record
without authentication from the lead agent. In that situation, the
contents of the agent's personnel file and the ongoing internal affairs
20 2
investigation would likely be inadmissible.
Second, requiring disclosure of all impeachment evidence prior
to a guilty plea would cause a delay in criminal proceedings while
prosecutors comb their files and the files of investigative officers
200. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 631.
201. Douglass, supra note 36, at 497-98 (pre-Ruiz discussion concluding that Brady doctrine
is ill-suited to guilty plea situations, and should be left to its original purpose of assuring a fair
trial).
202. While it is true that in many jurisdictions a defendant may impeach his own witness,
see FED. R. EVID. 602, and thus could conceivably call the lead agent for the primary purpose of
getting impeachment evidence in front of the jury, as a matter of discovery rather than
permissible trial strategy, the Brady/Giglio line of cases does not require the government to
assist the defense by disclosing impeachment information for defense witnesses See, e.g., United
States v. Johnson, 581 F.3d 320, 331 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Presser, 844 F.2d 1275,
1285 (6th Cir. 1988).
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attempting to identify impeachment information. Typically it is the
process of trial preparation (carefully scrutinizing witness statements
and police reports, preparing exhibits, re-interviewing witnesses, etc.)
that prompts prosecutors to notice discrepancies that could be used for
impeachment purposes. It takes considerable skill and effort to extract
impeachment information from case agents, 20 3 as reflected in Scenario
1, where not all of the alleged rape victim's inconsistent statements
were reduced to writing. This is particularly true in complex white
collar cases that may involve parallel civil and criminal proceedings
and multiple indictments involving sequential violent crimes (e.g.,
serial rapes or murders) that may cross several jurisdictions and
involve more than one police department. A rule of criminal procedure
or ethics that required disclosure of all impeachment information
before a guilty plea (especially if it is nonwaivable) would require
prosecutors to conduct an exhaustive review of government files before
disposing of any case to make sure that everything conceivably
impeaching has been turned over. Criminal cases would take longer to
resolve, and prosecutors would be capable of handling fewer cases,
undercutting the primary efficiency rationale for plea bargaining.
These delays might actually end up hurting criminal defendants more
than they are helped by a rule of preplea disclosure. Since one of the
government's primary motivations for plea bargaining is resource
preservation, a prosecutor might offer less favorable sentencing
recommendations to defendants once the functional equivalent of trial
preparation has occurred. 20 4 Moreover, if pretrial proceedings take
longer from arraignment to disposition, then defendants held in
custody awaiting trial will be adversely affected, particularly where
the ultimate disposition pursuant to a plea bargain is a suspended
20 5
sentence or "time served."
Third, requiring disclosure of impeachment information before
a guilty plea does not reflect the reality of criminal justice practice in
very busy state courts, particularly with respect to the handling of
routine misdemeanors and low-level felonies. Those who advocate for
enhanced disclosures seem to focus primarily on federal court practice,
where Assistant U.S. Attorneys often work closely with case agents on
criminal investigations and spend substantial time interviewing
critical witnesses in the presence of those agents. In those situations,
203. Green, supra note 6, at 2179.
204. See Covey, supra note 184, at 74. Under the trial shadow theory of plea bargaining, a
rational prosecutor will discount the likely sentence after trial by the likelihood of acquittal and
the costs associated with preparing and trying the case.
205. Douglass, supranote 36, at 448 n.43.
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prosecutors may have more knowledge of and access to impeachment
information. However, for routine misdemeanors in state court, guilty
pleas with little or no investigation or discovery beyond an arresting
officer's police report and a booking sheet are often*the norm. 20 6 Given
high caseload volume, prosecutors might not have an opportunity to
speak with victims or police officers before a guilty plea other than in
a busy corridor of the courthouse at or near arraignment. 2 7 If they do,
then they may not have an opportunity to commit these conversations
to writing for their files. Staff turnover, reassignment, or horizontal
prosecution systems might mean that more than one prosecutor is
involved in a case from screening to disposition. In those situations,
information obtained by one prosecutor may not be communicated
adequately to another, or if it is, it may not have been adequately
documented. Exacerbating this problem is the fact that low-level
criminal charges are frequently handled by the most junior and
inexperienced lawyers. Whereas case volume might prevent
prosecutors from having time to review their files thoroughly before a
change of plea, inexperience might prevent them from even
recognizing the significance of certain impeachment information if
they see it.
Finally, plea agreements that are entered into prior to the
completion of discovery often promote witness privacy and safety.
Mandating preplea disclosure of impeachment evidence might require
prosecutors to reveal the identity of undercover operatives and
cooperating witnesses very soon after arraignment, thus risking their
physical safety, exposing them to tampering and intimidation, and
undermining their ability to continue to work with the government on
other pending investigations. 20 8 Presently, federal prosecutors seek to
protect these security interests either by delaying disclosure of
witness identity and statements until immediately before trial 20 9 or by
206. See Prosser, supra note 34, at 555.
207. See Blasser et al., supranote 38, at 1981.
208. It is for this reason that some states do not require the government to disclose the list of
witnesses it plans to call until a specified number of days before trial. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 1054.1(a), 1054.7 (prosecuting attorney must produce witness list no fewer than thirty days
before trial); DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 12.3(a)(2) (attorney general must produce witness list no
fewer than twenty days before trial).
209. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16, unlike the criminal discovery rules in many jurisdictions, does not
require the government to turn over a list of witnesses prior to trial. Although the Jencks Act, 18
U.S.C. § 3500, allows a prosecutor to turn over witness statements immediately after that
witness has testified on direct examination, as a practical matter most federal prosecutors turn
over Jencks material within a reasonable time before trial, often as part of an agreed-upon
discovery order. See Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Discovery of Jencks Witness Statements: Timing
Makes a Difference, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 671 (1999).
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seeking a protective order under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
16(d). The Jencks Act 210 was intended to mediate the tension between
witness safety and the disclosure of sufficient evidence to allow the
defendant to prepare for trial.2 11 A rule requiring disclosure of
impeachment evidence before a guilty plea would undercut this
legislative accommodation, because in most instances it is impossible
to disclose impeachment material without giving away the identity of
212
the witness whom it impeaches.
Impeachment information may also be included in the school
records, employment records, and medical records of victims or
witnesses. If all such impeachment information were required to be
disclosed prior to a guilty plea, then the government's ability to
protect those witnesses from embarrassing personal revelations would
vanish. In the long run, the diminished protection could discourage
victims from reporting crime. The Crime Victims' Rights Act grants
victims the right "to be reasonably protected from the accused" 2 13 and
214
the right to be treated "with respect for [their] dignity and privacy"
and requires prosecutors to use their "best efforts" to protect these
rights. 21 5 A broad construction of Model Rule 3.8(d) would be
inconsistent with the purpose-if not the explicit requirements-of
that Act.
Returning to our hypotheticals, imagine an alleged instance of
acquaintance rape of the sort described in Scenario 1. In addition to
the prior inconsistent statements of the victim, assume that the
government has information that the victim in question made an
allegation of child sexual abuse against her stepfather when she was
twelve years old that was later withdrawn. Arguably this is
impeachment evidence that could be used at trial under Federal Rule
of Evidence 608(b) or its state equivalent and is therefore subject to

210. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2006).
211. See United States v Bobadilla-Lopez, 954 F.2d 519, 521 (9th Cir. 1992).
212. See United States v. Colacurcio, No. CR-09-209TAJ, at *9 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 9, 2010)
(ruling that a Washington state ethical rule requiring a prosecutor to make "timely" disclosure of
exculpatory evidence to the accused did not override the Jencks act by operation of the McDade
Amendment, and that in any event, disclosure of witness statements eight weeks before trial was
timely for purposes of state ethics rule). The court recognized in Colacurciothat "[in general, it
will be difficult at best to extract 'information' from a witness statement without revealing the
witness's identity or at least giving substantial clues as to the witness's identity." Id.
213. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(1) (2006).
214. § 3771(a)(8).
215. § 3771(c).
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disclosure before trial under Brady.2 16 Let us further assume that the
co-employee in the date rape case is willing to plead guilty to a lesser
included offense of indecent assault and battery in exchange for the
prosecutor's recommendation of a suspended sentence and probation.
Many prosecutors would prefer to avoid a very difficult Brady issue
while at the same time protecting the victim's privacy by entering into
a plea bargain. A rule that requires disclosure of all impeaching
material before a guilty plea, without the capacity for waiver, would
effectively preclude such a pragmatic calculus. It would also conflict
with many child abuse protection 217 and rape counseling privilege
statutes 218 across the country that treat such information as
confidential and not subject to disclosure except by following a
rigorous protocol, such as motion, threshold showing, and in camera
judicial inspection. 219 Similar privacy concerns have motivated some
states to enact police protection statutes, 220 which preclude
prosecutors from turning over impeachment information contained in
law enforcement personnel files except upon motion of the defendant
establishing grounds and materiality (as in Scenario 3).
Advocates of more fulsome preplea disclosure undoubtedly will
argue that the witness privacy and safety interests I have identified

216. See State v. Harris, 680 N.W.2d 737, 752-53 (Wis. 2004). Whether a prior withdrawn
allegation of sexual assault can be used to impeach an alleged rape victim will depend on the
particular context of the case and the contours of the state's rape shield statute. The allegation of
child abuse may have been withdrawn because it was insincere or inaccurate, or it may have
been withdrawn because family members or medical professionals caring for the victim did not
wish to expose her to further trauma or intimidation. See Dennis v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.3d
466, 472 (Ky. 2010) (under Kentucky's rape shield rule, evidence concerning an alleged victim's
prior allegation of sexual impropriety is not admissible unless the proponent establishes at a
pretrial hearing that the accusation was demonstrably false); State v. Guenther, 854 A.2d 308,
321 (N.J. 2004) (collecting cases).
217. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 n.17 (1987) (recognizing that all fifty states
have enacted statutes providing in some fashion for the confidentiality of state records of child
abuse investigations, and reconciling a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial under the
Fourteenth Amendment with this statutory privilege by remanding for in camera judicial review
to determine what information was material to the defense).
218. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-802.1(d) (2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20J
(2000); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4510(b) (McKINNEY 2007).
219. See Tera Jackowski Peterson, Distrust and Discovery: The Impending Debacle in
Discovery of Rape Victim's Counseling Records in Utah, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 695, 705-06 (2001)
(explaining that, after Ritchie, procedures governing disclosure of counseling records of rape
victims "vary widely"); see also Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d 400, 418 (Mass. 2006)
("Before ordering that a summons issue for [presumptively privileged] records, [a] judge... must
evaluate whether the ... requirements of relevance, admissibility, necessity, and specificity have
been met .. ") (internal quotations omitted).
220. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 832.7(a) (West 2008); N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW § 50-a
(MCKINNEY 2009).
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can best be accommodated by protective orders of the court and that
we should entrust such determinations to neutral judges rather than
to the unchecked discretion of adversarial prosecutors. For example,
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 allows a prosecutor to submit
potentially discoverable material to the court for in camera inspection
22 1
and request an order denying, restricting, or deferring disclosure.
ABA Model Rule 3.8(d) similarly creates an exception for a
prosecutor's disclosure obligations "when the prosecutor is relieved of
this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal." 222 But
requiring the prosecutor to seek a protective order to protect the
privacy and safety interests of victims, witnesses, and undercover
operatives-even when the defendant intends to plead guilty-creates
further steps in the litigation, causes delays, and imposes resource
costs on the courts, undermining several of the primary efficiency
rationales for plea bargaining. Given the limited resources of many
prosecutors' offices and the pressure on them to move casesespecially in busy urban state courts-it is simply impractical to
expect them to seek protective orders at the very early stage of every
criminal case where the safety and privacy interests of witnesses may
be implicated, especially when they have received every indication
223
that the defendant intends to plead guilty.
With these significant obstacles in mind, let us now return to
Professor McMunigal's "accuracy" argument in favor of preplea
impeachment disclosures. I concede that the pressures on defendants
to plead guilty in the U.S. criminal justice system are enormous 224 and
that innocent defendants sometimes plead guilty. 22 5 They may do so to
protect loved ones, to avoid harsh sentencing schemes enacted by the
legislature, to avoid trial if they distrust the ability of their counsel to
represent them effectively, or to avoid outcome uncertainty due to the
information deficits as to their own guilt or innocence that McMunigal
and others describe. In my view, the proper way to improve the

221. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(1). The Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) also allows
the government to move for a protective order to protect against the disclosure of any classified
information that might pose a harm to national security. See 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1, 3 (2006).
222. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (1983).
223. Blasser et al., supra note 38, at 1969 (noting disagreement among members of the
discovery working group as to whether protective orders are feasible given the limited resources
of many prosecutors' offices).
224. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750-51 (1970); see Albert Alschuler, The
Prosecutor'sRole in Plea Bargaining,36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 58 (1968).
225. See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 536 (2005) (a study of defendants later exonerated through DNA
evidence showed that six percent of them had pleaded guilty).
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accuracy of guilty pleas is to repeal (or at least curtail the expansion
of) harsh mandatory-minimum penalties, 2 26 reduce the huge disparity
in sentences between those who plead guilty and those who are
convicted at trial,227 improve the investigative and trial resources
available to counsel for the indigent, 228 and prohibit prosecutors from
threatening to prosecute loved ones to obtain leverage over a
defendant. 229 Courts should also require disclosure of all "core" or
"classic" Brady material prior to a guilty plea and be unwilling to
accept any plea agreement containing a waiver of access to evidence
that supports factual innocence. 23 0 With each of these inequities
addressed, defendants in doubt about their guilt or innocence will feel
less constrained to plead guilty and more empowered to proceed to
trial (prior to which impeachment disclosures will be made by the
prosecutor under Giglio). Starting with impeachment disclosures as a
way to attack the accuracy problem is like performing surgery with a
sledgehammer; it creates all of the problems I identified above while
ignoring some of the most troublesome sources of injustice in our
criminal justice system.
In fact, mandating preplea disclosure of impeachment
information might turn out primarily to benefit guilty defendants, who
will either (1) be provided with a strategic advantage during the plea
bargaining in terms of leveraging a more favorable deal or (2) due to
the excessive baggage carried by government witnesses, be more
willing to roll the dice and proceed to trial notwithstanding their
factual guilt. Defendants who prey on victims with troubled histories,
through either fortuity or guile, may fare better in our plea bargaining
system than those who victimize the strong and the less vulnerable.
Neither the retributive nor the deterrent aims of our criminal justice
system are furthered by such a perverse result.

226. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea BargainingOutside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2468, 2486-87 (identifying structural impediments that distort plea bargaining, including
mandatory minimum sentences).
227. See Markus Dirk Dubber, American Plea Bargains,German Lay Judges, and the Crisis
of Criminal Procedure,49 STAN. L. REV. 547, 552-53 (1997) (advocating for enhancing legitimacy
of plea bargaining by improving Rule 11 colloquies and reducing prosecutors' sentencing
leverage).
228. See Babcock, supra note 131, at 1174 (arguing for more public defenders, increased
support for them, and a greater commitment by the private bar to pro bono work).
229. See R. Michael Cassidy, Some Reflections on Ethics and Plea Bargaining:An Essay in
Honor of Fred Zacharias, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 93, 105 (2011) (condemning such practice as
highly coercive).
230. See supra note 68 and cases cited.
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V. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS GOING FORWARD

There appear to be at least three obvious solutions to the
question of how much impeachment evidence should be disclosed by a
prosecutor before a guilty plea. First, the rules of criminal procedure
might not require the disclosure of any impeachment information
before allocution (the Ruiz approach). Another possibility is to require
disclosure of impeachment information that is so important and
potentially significant to the defendant's decision to plead guilty that
the evidence is considered "material." A third possibility would be to
require disclosure of all impeachment information known to the
prosecutor (the stance arguably taken by ABA Formal Opinion 09-454
and the 2003 ACTL proposal to amend Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 16). Yet each of these resolutions is unsatisfactory, which is
precisely why the problem of impeachment disclosures has thus far
presented itself as so intractable.
For the reasons described above, requiring disclosure of all
impeachment information without regard to materiality is unwise and
unworkable. In a domestic violence case where the victim confides in
the prosecutor in the courtroom corridor, "I told my boss I was sick
today because I was too embarrassed to tell him that I was coming to
court," that prosecutor would have to turn that statement over to the
defendant as evidence of a prior act of dishonesty. 231 For good reason,
Brady does not require that the government deliver its entire file to
defense counsel 232 or "divulge every possible shred of evidence that
could conceivably benefit the defendant." 233 The world is too vast and
hindsight bias is too strong.
Even the move to "open file" discovery undertaken by a limited
number of jurisdictions 234 will not eliminate the impeachment
conundrum. First, open file discovery presupposes that the prosecutor
231. Other complications ensue. If the prosecutor was the only witness to the statement, she
risks being disqualified from representing the state should the case proceed to trial. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7(a) (1983); see also In re Attorney C, 47 P.3d 1167, 1169 (Colo.
2002). If the prosecutor anticipates that risk and brings another witness into the conversation,
such as a victim witness advocate or police officer, that agent then must undertake the
additional burden of memorializing the conversation in writing so that it can be accurately
disclosed to the defense.
232. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985) ("ITihe prosecutor is not required to
deliver his entire file to defense counsel, but only to disclose evidence favorable to the accused
that, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial.").
233. United States v. Hamilton, 107 F.3d 499, 509 (7th Cir. 1997).
234. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-903 (2010); E.D. Wisc. Crim. R. 16. See generally

Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to Disbarment of Mike Nifong:
The CriticalImportance of Open File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257 (2008).
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will turn over documents and tangible evidence contained in his file; it
does not capture situations where the victim or another witness has
told the prosecutor or police officer something orally that has not been
reduced to writing, as in Scenario 4 above. Moreover, open file
discovery policies typically do not specify what documents in the
possession of other government agencies must be transmitted to the
prosecutor's office, as in Scenario 3, with regard to impeachment
material contained in an agent's personnel file. While an open file
approach to discovery might be intuitively appealing due to its
simplicity, it fails to capture the complexities of many real-life
impeachment scenarios.
The tensions I identify above seem to cry out for a middle
23 5
ground solution. One possibility is a renewed focus on materiality.
Although both the ABA in Formal Opinion 09-454 and the advocates
of Rule 16 reform have advocated abandoning materiality as a
touchstone for a prosecutor's disclosure obligations with respect to
classically exculpatory evidence, perhaps jurisdictions should retain it
as the litmus test for when impeachment information needs to be
turned over by the prosecutor prior to a guilty plea. The problem with
this approach is that materiality-already decried as an unworkable
framework to guide prosecutorial disclosure obligations 236-is even
more vague and indefinite with regard to impeachment evidence than
237
it is with regard to classically exculpatory information.
Identification procedures that suggest someone else committed the
235. Notwithstanding Ruiz, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has interpreted that state's
pertinent rule of criminal procedure to require a prosecutor, upon request, to turn over material
impeaching information prior to a guilty plea, at least where the change of plea occurs close to
the scheduled trial date. See State v. Harris, 680 N.W.2d 737, 755-56 (Wis. 2004) (affirming
allowance of motion to withdraw guilty plea where prosecutor failed to turn over in child sexual
assault prosecution other pending accusation by victim against grandfather, because other
incident might have been used to show sexual knowledge by youthful victim). The court in Harris
was interpreting WIS. STAT. § 971.23, which required the disclosure of exculpatory evidence
"within a reasonable time before trial." Id. at 755.
236. See Burke, supra note 37, at 509 (noting that after 45 years of Brady jurisprudence
there are very few useful guidelines for prosecutors about materiality).
237. Eleven years ago, the Ethics 2000 Commission proposed to amend the comments to
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8(d) to require prosecutors to disclose evidence that
"materially tends to impeach" a government witness. This comment would have added a
materiality element for impeachment material, even though as discussed above materiality
arguably is not a precondition for the ethical obligation to disclose classically exculpatory
evidence under the "tends to negate guilt" language of Rule 3.8(d). Nevertheless, the Department
of Justice successfully opposed this revised comment due to the potential elasticity of the
impeachment concept and the difficulty of predicting materiality in a pretrial context. See
Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Summary of the
Work of Ethics 2000, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 441, 469 (2002); see also Kuckes, supra note 119,
at 439.
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crime, evidence from other eyewitnesses that exculpate the defendant,
or forensic test results inconsistent with the defendant's guilt are
easier to spot as material in the sense that they could affect a jury's
determination of guilt or innocence. The significance of impeachment
evidence, because it is so contextualized in terms of what affirmative
evidence it undermines and how convincingly it does so, is far more
difficult to assess. 238 In the absence of reciprocal discovery from the
defendant, the prosecutor may not know what shape the defense will
take and what elements of the crime will be in dispute. 239 A
materiality approach also raises the difficult conceptual question of
"material to what?" Is the prosecutor supposed to forecast the likely
effect of the impeachment evidence on a trial if one were to occur, or
the likely effect of the impeachment evidence on the defendant's
decision to plead guilty?24° The former might be too far away at the
time of plea discussions to assess with accuracy before the prosecutor
determines which witnesses are likely to be called and what physical
evidence will be introduced. The latter requires the prosecutor to
speculate about the impact of the information on a defendant's
decision to plead guilty, which of course will vary depending on the
defendant's degree of risk aversion. 241 If the death of Nicholas Marsh,
Stevens's former prosecutor, 242 teaches us anything, it is that
prosecutors need more concrete guidance and direction with regard to
impeachment evidence than a vague "materiality" standard can
provide.
238. This is why Lanny Breuer, on behalf of the Department of Justice, opposed the most
recent proposal to amend Rule 16 to require disclosure of information that casts "substantial

doubt" upon the testimony of any witness, suggesting that codifying that standard would prompt
"decades of litigation" to unpack its meaning. See supra note 111.
239. Burke, supra note 40, at 2125 (arguing that a lack or failure of reciprocal discovery can
also impair Brady disclosures because "the prosecutor may not realize that a piece of evidence is
favorable to the defense if she does not know the defense's theory of the case"); see, e.g., FED. R.
CRIM. P. 12.1 (requiring notice of alibi defense); FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2 (requiring notice of insanity

defense); FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.3 (requiring notice of public authority defense).
240. See Douglass, supra note 36, at 472-74 (discussing the effect on, and application of,
Brady's materiality standard on guilty pleas); Hashimoto, supra note 186, at 955 (noting that
with respect to nondisclosure of evidence that supports factual innocence, courts since Ruiz have
been inquiring whether there is a reasonable probability that it would have affected the
defendant's decision to plead guilty).
241. Even if a court takes an objective approach and asks whether the disclosure of the
withheld evidence would have caused a reasonable defendant to elect to proceed to trial, that
task is still exceptionally difficult. See Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278, 294 (1st Cir. 2006)
("While this checklist is useful, experience teaches that each defendant's decision as to whether
or not to enter a guilty plea is personal and, thus, unique. Consequently, the compendium of
relevant factors and the comparative weight given to each will vary from case to case.").
242. Toobin, supra note 1, at 39.
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Right now, local federal rules vary greatly on the subject of
Brady and Giglio disclosures. 243 Some district rules, similar to Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, say nothing about exculpatory
evidence and leave that requirement to enforcement of constitutional
norms. 244 Other districts expressly incorporate Brady and Giglio by
reference. 245 Still other districts have begun to distinguish in their
local rules between evidence that is exculpatory because it supports
factual innocence and evidence that is exculpatory because it is
impeaching, requiring the disclosure of the former a certain number of
days following arraignment and the latter a certain number of days
before trial (similar to the 2006 proposal submitted by the Advisory
Committee to the Standing Committee). 246 Finally, some jurisdictions
have followed the 2003 ACTL suggestion (now resurrected by Judge
Emmet Sullivan) by requiring disclosure of all favorable evidence
without regard to materiality and without distinguishing between
classically exculpatory and impeaching information. 247 Given that over
ninety percent of criminal cases in federal court are resolved by a
guilty plea, 248 one nettlesome question this landscape presents is
whether such a huge disparity in practice across the federal districts
is acceptable.
State rules of criminal procedure also vary widely in their
approach to the disclosure of impeachment evidence, although they
tend to be even less evolved than the local federal rules. 2 49 A minority
of states have narrow rules like Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
16 that make no explicit reference at all to exculpatory evidence and
therefore leave that obligation to judicial construction of due process

243. See HOOPER & THORPE, supra note 76, at 25-38 (providing a district by district
comparison).
244. See, e.g., D. ARIZ.LOC. R. 16.1; D. Wyo. CRIM.R. 16.1.
245. See, e.g., N.D.N.Y. R. Crim. P. 14.1(b)(2); M.D. TENN. CRIM. R. 16.01(a)(2)(d).
246. D. HAw. CRIM. R. 16.1(a)(7), (g)(2) (requiring disclosure of Brady material seven days
after arraignment, and impeachment material "as ordered by the court"); N.D.N.Y. R. CRIM. P.
14.1(b)(2), (d)(1) (requiring disclosure of Brady material fourteen days after arraignment and
Giglio material fourteen days prior to trial); D. VT. CR.R. 16(a)(2), (d)(1) (requiring disclosure of
Brady material fourteen days after arraignment and Giglio material fourteen days prior to jury
selection).
247. S.D. ALA. R. 16.13(b)(1)(B) (requiring disclosure of all information "favorable to the
defendant ... without regard to materiality"); S.D. GA. CRIM. R. 16.1(0 (requiring disclosure of
"any evidence favorable to the defendant" within seven days of arraignment).
248. Laura I. Appleman, The PleaJury, 85 IND. L.J. 731, 741 (2010).
249. See Prosser, supra note 34, at 577 (providing an overview of jurisdictional variations).
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requirements. 250
Most states incorporate the constitutional
requirements of Brady/Giglio in their criminal discovery rules, either
explicitly 25 1 or implicitly, by using terms such as "exculpatory
evidence,"252 information "favorable" to the accused, 253 or evidence that
"tends to negate" guilt, 254 with notes in their commentaries linking the
obligation to Brady and thereby implicitly incorporating a materiality
element. My research revealed no state jurisdiction that explicitly
distinguishes between disclosure of exculpatory evidence before trial
or before a guilty plea: in some states, the timing of disclosures is left
vague with words such as "timely," "as soon as practicable," or "within
a reasonable time before trial,"2 55 while in other states disclosure is
required a specified number of days after request. 256 California has the
narrowest disclosure rules. As a result of Proposition 115, California
Penal Code section 1054 requires prosecutors to disclose an extensive
257
list of matters to the defendant, including "exculpatory evidence."
However, section 1054.7 provides that these disclosures need only be
made thirty days before trial.258 Two of the primary goals of the
referendum were to simplify criminal litigation and to protect
witnesses from harassment or intimidation.259
While some state rules require disclosure of certain types of
impeachment information, 260 only one state appears to generally
reference all "impeachment" evidence in its criminal discovery rules.
Maryland differentiates when impeachment information must be
disclosed to the defendant based on seriousness of offense and court of
jurisdiction. In practice before the district courts of Maryland, the
prosecutor must disclose before trial all evidence and information that

250. See Jenny Roberts, Too Little, Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to
Investigate, and Pre-Trial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1099, 1123
(2004) (providing an overview of jurisdictional variations).
251. N.H. SUP. CT. R. 98(A)(2)(iv); TENN. R. CRIM.P. 16, advisory commission comment.
252. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.1(e) (West 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.23(1)(h)
(West 2008); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14(a)(1)(A)(iii).
253. See, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 718(1); OHIO CRIM. R. 16(B)(1)(5).
254. See, e.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R. 412(c); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.01(6).

255. See, e.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R. 412(c), (d); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.23(1)(h).
256. See, e.g., ALA. R. CRIM. P. 16. 1(c)(1); S.C. R. CRIM. P. 5(a)(3).
257. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.1(e) (West 2011).
258. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.7.
259. Berend, supra note 189, at 495 n.105.
260. Massachusetts requires disclosure of "promises, rewards or inducements" made to
Commonwealth witnesses, MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14(a)(1)(A)(ix). Illinois requires disclosure of "any
record of prior criminal convictions" of persons whom the state intends to call as witnesses. ILL.
SUP. CT. R. 412(a)(vi).
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"tends to impeach a State's witness."26 1 No preplea disclosure of
impeachment material is required, provided that the change of plea
occurs before the start of trial. However, for felonies prosecuted in the
circuit courts of Maryland, the rule is quite different. The prosecutor
must disclose without request and within thirty days after the
defendant's first appearance "all material or information in any form,
262
whether or not admissible, that tends to impeach a State's witness."
The term "tends to impeach" is defined to include seven specific
subcategories of information. 263 Maryland thus takes a rather
schizophrenic approach, requiring either the disclosure of all
impeachment information or no impeachment information before a
guilty plea (absent waiver), depending on the seriousness of the
offense.
Clearly jurisdictions are struggling with this issue. 26 4 Yet,
unlike Goldilocks testing out the beds in the house of the three bears,
261. MD. R. 4-262(d)(1).
262. Id.
263. See MD. R. 4-263(d)(6)(A)-(G) (including prior conduct of untruthfulness, agreements, or
understandings to induce testimony, prior criminal convictions, and pending charges against
witness, prior materially inconsistent statements, medical or psychiatric condition that may
impair the witness's ability to testify truthfully and accurately, the fact that the witness has
taken but did not pass a polygraph, and the failure of the witness to identify the defendant or a
codefendant).
264. Another committee of the American Bar Association, the Standards Committee of the
Criminal Justice Section, is presently in the process of drafting a fourth edition of the Standards
on Administration of Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense Functions (latest available
draft, Summer 2010). Their work is only in draft form, and has not yet been approved by the
ABA. See Rory K. Little, The ABA's Project to Revise the Criminal Justice Standards for the
Prosecution and Defense Functions, 62 HASTINGS. L.J. 1111 (2011) (draft standards available at
appendix). The Criminal Justice Standards Committee has encountered the same tensions and
difficulties with regard to preplea impeachment disclosures as those identified in this article.
The proposal as presently drafted distinguishes between disclosure obligations before trial, id. at
1147 (Proposed Standard 3-5.5), and disclosure obligations before a guilty plea, id. at 1148-49
(Proposed Standard 3-5.7 (e)). For disclosure obligations before trial, the Standards Committee
recommends specifically adding reference to information that "impeaches the government's
witnesses or evidence." Id. at 1147 (Proposed Standard 3-5.5(a)). It also expressly dispenses with
the materiality element of Brady, by requiring pretrial disclosure "regardless of whether the
prosecution thinks it will change the result of the proceeding." Id. (Proposed Standard 3-5.5(c)).
Thus, according to these draft standards, all impeachment evidence must be turned over before
trial. But in the case of plea bargains, the Committee reverts to the bald "tends to negate guilt"
language of the old standard, thereby preserving the "materiality" ambiguity. All evidence
"tending to negate guilt" should optimally be turned over before a guilty plea, although a
prosecutor "on an individualized basis [may] seek and accept a knowing and voluntary waiver."
Id. at 1149 (Proposed Standard 3-5.7(e), (f)). Even in that event, however, the "prosecutor should
always disclose evidence known to the prosecutor that directly suggests the defendant is
innocent." Id. (Proposed Standard 3-5.7(f)). On the difficult issue of preplea disclosure of
impeachment information, therefore, the Standards Committee has essentially "punted." Ellen
Yaroshefsky, ProsecutorialDisclosure Obligations, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1341 (2011) ("This
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none of the approaches identified above seem to fit quite right.
Certainly the solution that is the clearest, the easiest to apply, the
most efficient, and the most protective of witness privacy is to require
no impeachment disclosures whatsoever before a guilty plea. But is
that fair to defendants? Two particular forms of impeachment
material strike me as serious enough to potentially undermine our
confidence in the voluntariness and accuracy of a guilty plea. One is a
witness's inability or failure to identify the defendant from an
identification procedure (e.g., photo array, lineup, etc.). 265 In a case
that hinges on identification, the failure of a witness to identify the
defendant when given an opportunity to do so is perhaps the most
damaging form of impeachment imaginable, bordering on the factually
exculpatory. The other powerful form of impeachment evidence is
266
promises, rewards, and inducements given to a government witness.
This evidence may be critical not only to show a motive by the witness
to fabricate, but also to allow the defendant to assess whether the
actions of the cooperating witness during the investigation are
attributable to the government for purposes of raising a possible
entrapment defense. 267 While experienced defense counsel typically
move for disclosure of these two forms of impeachment evidence
during discovery, 268 making such disclosure automatic prior to a guilty
plea (absent a protective order or waiver) may serve the collateral
purpose of helping to insulate convictions from later attack on the
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel.
These observations lead me to conclude that if any changes are
contemplated in this area, the rules of criminal procedure might be
amended to require the disclosure of certain categories of
impeachment information prior to a guilty plea, on the presumption
that more often than not those categories of impeachment evidence
leaves unresolved the debate over whether impeachment evidence should be revealed prior to
entry of a guilty plea.").
265. See State v. Curtis, 384 So. 2d 396, 398 (La. 1980) (explaining that the sole eyewitness's
failure to identify the defendant from earlier photo array was materially impeaching of
eyewitness's later in-court identification because "[in court] identification was the most
important and key evidence presented against defendant, and his reliability would have been a
crucial factor in the jury's determination of defendant's guilt").
266. See generally R. Michael Cassidy, "Soft Words of Hope:" Giglio, Accomplice Witnesses,
and the Problem of Implied Inducements, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1129 (2004).
267. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 64 (1957) (explaining the importance of such
evidence).
268. See, e.g., JACK B. HOOD & HERBERT H. HENRY II, ALABAMA CRIMINAL TRIAL PRACTICE
FORMS § 16:3(II)(20)(I), (M) (2010) (including as part of a discovery template requests for
information relating to the misidentification of the defendant and promises made to witnesses);
OHIO CRIMINAL DEFENSE MOTIONS F 2:6 (2008) (same).
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are critical to a defendant's decision whether to plead guilty or to
proceed to trial. The U.S. District Court in Massachusetts has adopted
such a categorical approach in its local rules. This court distinguishes
between information that must be automatically disclosed by the
prosecutor (absent waiver) twenty-eight days after arraignment and
2 69
information that must be disclosed twenty-one days before trial.
Four particular types of impeachment information are considered socalled "twenty-eight day" material: promises, rewards, and
inducements to prospective government witnesses; the prior criminal
record of prospective government witnesses; pending criminal charges
against prospective government witnesses; and a written description
of the failure of any percipient witness to identify the defendant
during an identification procedure. 270 Other common forms of
impeachment information are included in the list of "twenty-one day"
material, which may be withheld until shortly before trial. These
include prior inconsistent statements of government witnesses;
information revealing a bias or prejudice of the witness against the
defendant; a written description of any prior acts of dishonesty of the
witness that may be admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence
608(b); and information known to the government of any mental or
physical impairment of the witness that may cast doubt on the ability
of the witness to testify accurately and truthfully. 271 The practical
result of this bifurcated approach is to require disclosure of what the
court felt were the most important and damaging forms of
impeachment information prior to a guilty plea but to authorize the
government to delay other impeachment disclosures (particularly
those that would embarrass or invade the privacy of witnesses) until
272
shortly before trial.
Jurisdictions inclined to follow a categorical approach might
consider including in the early discovery category substantial
inconsistencies between a witness's versions of events on key elements

269. D. MAss. R. 116.2(B)(1), (2).
270. Id. at R. 116.2(B)(1)(b)-(O.
271. Id. at R. 116.2(B)(2)(b)-(g). This latter list is not exclusive, as Rule 116.2(B)(2)(a)
requires disclosure before trial of any information that "tends to cast doubt" on the credibility or
accuracy of any witness.
272. The local federal rule in Massachusetts also contains a written declination procedure
whereby the prosecutor can decline to produce certain information otherwise required by the
local rule. If the defendant files a motion to compel, the court may examine the material in
camera to determine whether any legitimate law enforcement interests (e.g., privacy, witness
safety, national security, or the integrity of ongoing investigations) warrants withholding the
material. Id. at R. 116.6(A).
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of the government's proof.273 While this category of Giglio information
resurrects the troublesome concept of materiality, that concession may
be necessary to capture instances where a victim's recollection of
events substantially changes over time. 274 An example might highlight
the difference in degree between varying forms of prior inconsistent
statements. In my rape hypothetical above (Scenario 1 in Part II), a
victim's description of events that varies over time in minor detail
(color of clothes, time of day, etc.) would be considered "twenty-one day
material" under the local federal rule in Massachusetts and therefore
such information would be subject to disclosure only before trial. But if
that same witness gave conflicting accounts of other aspects of the
alleged attack (use of contraceptives, number of instances or methods
of penetration, etc.) those inconsistencies may be so central to the
charged events as to seriously undermine the victim's credibility, even
if they are not factually exculpatory. In my view, conscientious
prosecutors should disclose those inconsistencies prior to a guilty plea
(absent an express waiver) even though in the District of
Massachusetts they would still be considered "twenty-one day
material" rather than "twenty-eight day material" because they do not
275
"directly" negate the defendant's guilt.
Let us return to the trial of Alaska Senator Ted Stevens on
charges of knowingly failing to list on Senate disclosure forms
approximately $250,000 in gifts and home renovations to a vacation
home in Alaska. Two of the damaging pieces of information that the
government withheld in that case were contained in notes from
prosecutors' pretrial interview with Bill Allen, a construction company
executive and friend of Stevens with close ties to the oil industry who
had agreed to cooperate with the government after being indicted for
bribing state legislators in Alaska. 276 During that interview
273. The Maryland Rules of Criminal Procedure require the prosecutor in circuit court cases
to disclose within thirty days of the defendant's first appearance "an oral statement of the
witness, not otherwise memorialized, that is materially inconsistent with another statement
made by the witness or with a statement made by another witness." MD. R. 4-263(d)(6)(D)
(emphasis added). The Local Rule of the United States District Court in Vermont defines Giglio
material to include "the content of substantially inconsistent statements that a witness has
made concerning issues material to guilt or punishment." D. VT. R. 16.0(d)(1)(B).
274. The January 4, 2010, Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General David Ogden to
federal prosecutors encourages prosecutors to memorialize and disclose "material variances in a
witness's statements," Main Memo, supra note 96, at 8-9, although the timing of these
disclosures is left to the discretion of individual prosecutors and local district court rules.
275. See D. MAsS. R. 116.2(B)(1)(a) (requiring disclosure within twenty-eight days of
arraignment of "[i]nformation that would tend directly to negate the defendant's guilt concerning
any count in the indictment or information").
276. Toobin, supra note 1, at 43.
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approximately five months before trial, Allen told prosecutors
(contrary to his later trial testimony) that the value of the contracting
services his company performed at the Girdwood chalet was only
about $80,000 and that he did not remember Bill Persons (a Stevens
emissary) telling Allen that the Senator did not want a bill, he was
only asking for one to "cover himself."277 Both of those statements
were favorable to the defense because they directly impeached Bill
Allen on central and damaging points of his trial testimony. The latter
statement was particularly relevant because it undercut the
government's theory that a note written by Stevens to Allen during
construction stating "you owe me a bill ...[This] just has to be done
right" was just a cover for the Senator to protect himself.278 The prior
statements themselves were not directly exculpatory, however; the
difference in value of the services ($250,000 or $80,000) does not
suggest factual or legal innocence, and the inability of Allen to recall
the Persons statement at the time of the interview, while impeaching
of a later ability to do so, did not directly exculpate Senator Stevens on
the issue of whether he knew that he had not fully paid for Allen's
services. The irony here is that Giglio requires the disclosure of these
inconsistencies before trial, but Ruiz does not require the disclosure of
them before a guilty plea. Even the Massachusetts local rule would
not alter that result. Had Ted Stevens entered into a plea agreement
containing a typical Ruiz waiver, he may never have learned of these
inconsistencies-even in the District of Massachusetts. If the drafters
of federal and state rules of criminal procedure opt to take a
categorical approach to impeachment disclosures-in my view, the
best available alternative if any amendment is undertaken-the
vexatious question that they must confront is whether fundamental
fairness requires the disclosure of material inconsistencies in the
accounts of key witnesses prior to a guilty plea.
CONCLUSION

In this Article, I urge caution on the part of rulemakers with
regard to mandating the disclosure of impeachment information
before a guilty plea. Although impeachment information has the same
constitutional stature as other forms of exculpatory evidence under
277. Neil A. Lewis, Dismissal for Stevens, but Question on 'Innocent', N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12,
2009, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/l2/us/politics/l2stevens.html; see
Transcript on Hearing on Motion to Set Aside Verdict at 13-14, United States v. Stevens, No. 08cr-231 (EGS), 2009 WL 6525926 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2009).
278. Toobin, supra note 1, at 43-44.
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Brady, treating it like other forms of evidence favorable to the accused
at the plea bargaining stage of a criminal case presents unique
dangers and obstacles. Professional conduct rules are a particularly
poor vehicle for reform in this area because they tend to be written at
such a high level of generality that they fail to provide concrete
guidance to attorneys and because they are enforced so infrequently
that they tend to be ignored. Due to the wide disparity in types of
cases handled (simple misdemeanors to complex felonies) and the
significant differences in the courts in which such crimes are
prosecuted (state versus federal), this matter is better dealt with by
individual jurisdictions in enacting rules of criminal procedure than
by broad and mostly hortatory rules of prosecutorial ethics. A
categorical approach to preplea impeachment disclosures is the most
promising option for jurisdictions seeking to provide more fulsome
discovery to defendants beyond Brady while at the same time
protecting other important interests such as efficiency, witness safety,
and victim privacy.

